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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON PRIVATE MEDICARE INSURANCE MARKETS

You Suk Kim
Hanming Fang

This dissertation consists of two essays in economics of industrial organization on private Medicare insurance markets. In the first chapter, together with Naoki Aizawa,
we study the incentives for private health insurers to use advertising to attract healthy
individuals in the market for private Medicare plans called Medicare Advantage (MA).
Using data on the advertising expenditures of MA plans, individual-level and countylevel MA enrollment, we document a large difference in an insurer’s potential profits
from healthy vs. unhealthy individuals. We then develop and estimate an equilibrium model of the MA market, which incorporates strategic advertising by insurers.
Parameter estimates show that advertising has much larger effects on the demand of
the healthy. We find that advertising accounts for 15% of the selection of healthier
individuals into Medicare Advantage. In the second chapter, I study how consumer
search frictions affect adverse selection and competition in the Medicare Supplement
Insurance (Medigap) market. Using data on individual-level and market-level Medigap enrollment and claim costs, I estimate an equilibrium model of the Medigap
market, which incorporates consumer search frictions and adverse selection. Parameter estimates show that search frictions are significant and that unhealthy consumers
tend to face greater search costs. I find that the correlation between search costs and
health risks reduces the extent of adverse selection by keeping unhealthy consumers
with high search costs outside the market. In a counterfactual experiment where the
v

government provides more information on available options, I find that the extent of
adverse selection increases and that healthy individuals become worse off.
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Chapter I

Advertising Competition and Risk
Selection in Health Insurance
Markets: Evidence from Medicare
Advantage
1

Introduction

Medicare provides health insurance for the majority of elderly Americans. Although
traditional fee-for-service Medicare is public insurance provided by the government,
many Medicare beneficiaries opt out of traditional Medicare to receive coverage from
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans offered by private insurance companies. A main
factor that differentiates MA plans from traditional Medicare is the provision of additional services at the cost of a restricted provider network. In 2011, about 25% of
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA. An MA plan receives a capitation payment
from the government for its enrollee and then bears the health care costs incurred by
the enrollee. The capitation payment accounts for most of the plans’ revenues, even
though MA plans often charge a premium.
A potential problem of MA is that private insurers have incentives to selectively
enroll low-cost, healthy individuals (or “risk-select”) due to an imperfect risk adjustment of capitation payments. Table 1 illustrates the presence of strong incentives
for risk selection by private insurers, and the incentives are observed not only in
1

Los Angeles but also in other regions throughout the nation. Given that regulations
prohibit an MA plan from charging different premiums to individuals with different
health risks, the opportunity to increase profits by enrolling healthier individuals provides insurers incentives to risk-select. Moreover, there is regional variation in the
amounts of over-payment for the healthy, which creates incentives for MA plans to
risk-select more intensively in regions with these higher over-payments. Indeed, previous research on MA finds that MA enrollees are healthier than traditional Medicare
enrollees.1 Although preference heterogeneity between healthy and unhealthy individuals for MA plans can partly account for the observed selection patterns, incentives
for risk selection, as illustrated by Table 1, are strong.
Table 1: Capitation Payment and Health Expenditure by Health Status in Los Angeles
County

Monthly Capitation Payment ($)
Monthly Health Expenditure ($)
Monthly Over-payment ($)

Excellent
601.0
266.0
335.0

Self-reported
Very Good
619.5
347.8
271.3

Health Status
Good Fair
Poor
646.6 708.0
796.3
575.4 923.7 2029.4
71.2 -215.7 -1233.1

Note: Over-payment = Capitation payment - Health Expenditure.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003

The main goal of this paper is to empirically study incentives for private insurers
to use advertising as a means of risk selection and the impacts of advertising on the
MA market. Previous work on risk selection views advertising as one of the central
tools of risk selection (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000; Brown et al. 2012). MA plans might
target advertising to healthy beneficiaries, for example, through its content (Neuman
et al. 1998; Mehrotra et al. 2006). Moreover, advertising can be targeted to regions
having greater over-payments for the healthy. When private insurers can risk-select
1

For examples, see Langwell and Hadley (1989); Mello et al. (2003); Batata (2004).
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with advertising, the effects will not be limited to MA enrollees and insurers, but
the government’s budget will also be affected through over-payments for the healthy.
Despite the potential importance of advertising in MA, however, there is no existing
quantitative analysis on the effects of advertising on risk selection or its effects on
health insurance markets in general.
In order to understand the role of advertising, we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of the MA market, which incorporates strategic advertising by insurers.
On the demand side of the model, consumers make a discrete choice to enroll with one
of the available MA insurers or to select traditional Medicare. We assume advertising
affects a beneficiary’s indirect utilities, thus capturing persuasive, prestige and signaling effects of advertising. We capture the effect of advertising on risk selection with
its heterogeneous effects on demand, depending on an individual’s health status. Customer preferences for a plan also depend on its other characteristics such as premiums
and coverage benefits. On the supply side, insurers simultaneously choose premiums
and levels of advertising to maximize profits. A firm’s revenue from an enrollee equals
the sum of the premium and capitation payment for the enrollee, while its cost of insuring an enrollee depends on plan characteristics and the enrollee’s health risk. Thus
the optimal pricing and advertising of a plan takes into account the effects of these
choices on the plan’s composition of health risks.
Our empirical analysis relies on data from a variety of sources. First, we use data
on advertising expenditures by health insurers in the 100 largest local advertising markets for the period 2000–2003 from AdSpender Database of Kantar Media, a leading
market research firm.2 Second, we use data on individual MA insurer choices, together
with information on the respondents’ demographic and health statuses. Third, we use
2

A local advertising market consists of a major city and its surrounding counties, and the 100
largest markets cover more than 80% of the total U.S. population.

3

data sets published by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which have
information on the number of enrollees and plan benefit characteristics for each plan
in each county in each year and capitation payments in each county in each year. The
data show the potential importance of advertising in relation to risk selection: There
is a large variation in advertising expenditures across local markets, and advertising
efforts by insurance companies are concentrated in markets with higher margins from
enrolling healthier individuals. Within a market, moreover, healthier individuals are
more likely to enroll with MA insurers that use more advertising.
We estimate the demand and supply side of the model in two steps, using generalized method of moments. For estimation of the demand model in the first step, we
allow for time-invariant plan fixed effects and use instrumental variables to account
for the endogeneity of premiums and advertising stemming from (time-varying) unobserved plan heterogeneity. In the second step, the supply model is estimated using
the estimated demand model and optimality conditions for observed pricing and advertising choices by insurers. In the supply model, we account for the possibility that
insurers choose zero advertising, which is frequently observed in the data. Parameter
estimates show that advertising has a positive effect on overall demand, but a much
larger effect on healthier consumers.
With the estimated model, we investigate the effects of advertising on the MA
market and evaluate the effects of a policy that adjusts capitation payments based on
an individual’s health risks. In order to investigate the effect of advertising on the MA
market, we simulate the model in an environment in which advertising is banned. The
ban decreases overall MA enrollment by 4% and enrollment for MA plans with aboveaverage advertising spending by 9%. Despite the lower demand without advertising,
we find that insurers lower their premiums by very little, which results from the
fact that MA enrollees become less healthy on average without advertising, raising
4

the MA insurers’ cost. The absence of advertising decreases the difference in the
expected health expenditures of enrollees in traditional Medicare and MA by 15%,
which reduces the average excess capitation payment per MA enrollee by 4%. This
finding implies that risk selection with advertising accounts for 15% of the selection
of healthier individuals into MA.
We also investigate the effects of a policy that reduces the incentive for risk selection. We consider a perfectly risk-adjusted capitation payment so that the difference
between an enrollee’s capitation payment and expected health expenditure is the same
for any individual. We find that the risk adjustment policy has large effects on the
equilibrium. Monthly premiums increase from $30.1 to $51.1; advertising expenditures decrease by 30%; and overall MA enrollment rates decrease by 9%. Because
the risk adjustment policy reduces capitation payments for healthy enrollees, insurers
compensate for the decrease in revenues by increasing premiums. Moreover, insurers
reduce advertising because insuring the healthy is now less profitable. These findings
highlight a strong link between risk selection and advertising.
This paper contributes to a large body of literature empirically investigating adverse selection and risk selection in insurance markets. Previous research finds that an
individual’s heterogeneous characteristics, such as risk, risk preference, income, and
cognitive ability, are important determinants of selection patterns in insurance markets.3 More recently, researchers empirically investigated the possibility that the insurer affects consumer selection in different health insurance market settings. Bauhoff
(2012) studies risk selection in a German health insurance market by looking at how
insurers respond differently to insurance applications from regions having different
profitabilities. Brown et al. (2012) provide descriptive evidence that insurers engage
3
For examples, see Chiappori and Salanie (2000) for automobile insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) for long-term care insurance, and Fang et al. (2008) for Medicare supplement insurance.
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in risk selection in MA, using the introduction of sophisticated risk adjustment of
capitation payments to MA plans. Kuziemko et al. (2013) study risk selection among
private Medicaid managed-care insurers in Texas and provide evidence that the insurers risk-select more profitable individuals. Although the occurrences of risk selection
are well documented in the related works, there is still little research on its channels. This paper adds to this literature by investigating the role of advertising on risk
selection.
Our focus on an insurance company’s behavior in insurance markets is related to
a new and growing body of literature studying demand and competition in insurance
markets. For example, Lustig (2011) studies adverse selection and imperfect competition in MA with an equilibrium model that endogenizes a firm’s choice of premium
and plan generosity by creating an index of generosity. Starc (2012) investigates the
impact of adverse selection on an insurer’s pricing and consumer welfare in an imperfectly competitive market (Medicare supplement insurance).4 This paper adds to this
literature by examining how advertising, which is a less explored and less regulated
channel relative to competition on pricing and coverage, affects risk selection and
competition.
Lastly, this paper is also related to the literature on advertising. Many empirical papers in the literature study the channels through which advertising influences
consumer demand–i.e., whether advertising gives information about a product or affects utility from the product.5 More recently, researchers have studied the effects of
advertising in an equilibrium framework for different markets. Goeree (2008) studies
advertising in the personal computer market in the U.S., and Gordon and Hartmann
4

For other works in this literature, see Bajari et al. (2011); Bundorf et al. (2012); Carlin and
Town (2007); Cohen and Einav (2007); Dafny and Dranove (2008); Einav et al. (2010a,b); Nosal
(2012); Town and Liu (2003).
5
For examples, see Ackerberg (2001, 2003); Ching and Ishihara (2012); Clark et al. (2009).
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(2013) study advertising in a presidential election in the U.S. A paper that is closely
related to ours is Hastings et al. (2013), who also study advertising in a privatized
government program (the privatized social security market in Mexico). An important
difference between this paper and the related works on advertising is that advertising
in MA affects not only consumers and insurers but also the government. If MA insurers can risk-select with advertising, the enrollment decisions made by healthy individuals will directly affect government expenditures because the government over-pays
for the insurance of these individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Medicare Advantage in
greater detail. Section 3 describes the data and presents results from the preliminary analysis. Section 4 outlines the model while Section 5 discusses estimation and
identification of the model. Section 6 provides estimates of the model, and Section 7
describes results from counterfactual analyses. Section 8 concludes.

2

Background on Medicare Advantage

Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the elderly (people aged 65 and
older) and for younger people with disabilities in the United States. Before the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006, which provides prescription drug coverage,
Medicare had three Parts: A, B, and C. Part A is free and provides coverage for
inpatient care. Part B provides insurance for outpatient care. Part C is the Medicare
Advantage program, previously known as Medicare + Choice until it was renamed in
2003.6
The traditional fee-for-service Medicare is comprised of Parts A and B, which
reimburse costs of medical care utilized by a beneficiary who is covered by Parts A
6

Although we will focus on the period 2000–2003 for our analysis, we will refer to Medicare private
plans as Medicare Advantage plans instead of Medicare + Choice plans.

7

and B. As an alternative to traditional Medicare, a Medicare beneficiary also has
the option to receive coverage from an MA plan run by a qualified private insurer.
Insurers wishing to enroll Medicare beneficiaries sign contracts with the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) describing what coverage they will provide,
and at what costs. The companies that participate in the MA program are usually health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or preferred provider organizations
(PPOs), many of which have a large presence in individual or group health insurance
markets, such as Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kaiser Permanente, United Healthcare, etc.
They contract with the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services on a county-year
basis and compete for beneficiaries in each county where they operate.
The main attraction of MA plans for a consumer is that they usually offer more
comprehensive coverage and provide benefits that are not available in traditional
Medicare. For example, many MA plans offer hearing, vision, and dental benefits
which are not covered by Parts A or B. Before the introduction of Part D, prescription
drug coverage was available in MA plans, but not in traditional Medicare. Although a
beneficiary in traditional Medicare is able to purchase Medicare supplement insurance
(known as Medigap) for more comprehensive coverage than basic Medicare Parts
A and B, the Medigap option is priced more expensively than a usual MA plan,
many of which require no premium. Therefore, MA is a relatively cheaper option
for beneficiaries who want more comprehensive coverage than traditional Medicare
offers. In return for greater benefits, however, MA plans usually have restrictions on
provider networks. Moreover, MA enrollees often need a referral to receive care from
specialists. In contrast, an individual in traditional Medicare can see any provider
that accepts Medicare payments.
Previous works on MA find that healthier individuals are systematically more

8

likely to enroll in a MA plan.7 The selection pattern may result from preference
heterogeneity between healthy and unhealthy individuals for MA plans. For example, unhealthy individuals may dislike certain aspects of MA plans such as restricted
provider networks and referral requirements. However, it is also possible that insurers’ risk-selection reinforces the direction of consumer selection. Indeed, incentives for
MA plans to risk-select are strong. By regulation, MA insurers must charge the same
premium for individuals with different health statuses in a county. More importantly,
capitation payments from the government do not fully account for variation in health
expenditures across individuals. Until the year 2000, the CMS paid capitation payments equal to 95% of the expected costs of treating a beneficiary within traditional
Medicare, and adjustments to payments were made based only on an enrollee’s age,
gender, welfare status, institutional status, and location. However, these adjustments,
based solely on demographic information, were found to account for only about 1%
of an enrollee’s expected health costs (Pope et al. 2004). During the period of 2000–
2003, which is a focus of this paper, the CMS made 10% of capitation payments
depend on inpatient claims data using the PIP-DCG risk adjustment model, but the
fraction of variations in expected health costs by the newer system remained around
1.5% (Brown et al. 2012).8
7

For example, see Langwell and Hadley (1989); Mello et al. (2003); Batata (2004).
From the year 2004, a more sophisticated risk adjustment model is implemented. However,
Brown et al. (2012) find that MA insurers were still able to selectively enroll more profitable individuals because even the new model did not perfectly account for variation in health expenditures
across individuals. The reason that we focus on the period 2000–2003 is discussed later when we
introduce our data.
8
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3

Data and Preliminary Analysis

3.1

Data

This paper combines data from multiple sources. We use the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) for the years 2000–2003 for individual-level information on
MA enrollment and demographic characteristics, including health status. Our data
on advertising by health insurers in local advertising markets for the years 2000–2003
were retrieved from the AdSpender Database of Kantar Media, a leading market research firm. Market share data for the years 2000–2003 are taken from the CMS
State-County-Plan (SCP) files, and insurers’ plan characteristics are taken from the
Medicare Compare databases for the years 2000–2003.9
The reason we study MA for the years 2000–2003 is because the MCBS does not
provide information on an individual’s choice of MA insurer from 2006 onward. We
also avoid using data right before 2006 because Medicare Part D was introduced in
that year, changing many aspects of the MA market.

3.1.1

Individual-level Data

The MCBS is a survey of a nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries.
This dataset provides information on a beneficiary’s demographic information such
as age, income, education, and location, as well as an extensive set of variables on
an individual’s health status: self-reported health status, difficulties in activities of
daily living (ADL), difficulties in instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), and a
history of diseases such as cancers, heart diseases, diabetes, etc. An important feature
of this dataset is that it is linked to administrative data in Medicare, which provides
information on an individual’s MA insurer choice, the amount of the capitation pay9

We thank Kathleen Nosal for sharing Medicare Compare data with us.
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ment paid for an MA enrollee in the sample, and the amount of Medicare claims costs
for individuals in traditional Medicare.
For our analysis, we only use observations who are at least 65 years old. This
means that we exclude the sample of individuals under 65 who are on Medicare solely
due to disability. Although these individuals can purchase MA plans, we exclude
them because the main factor that affected capitation payments for the years 2000–
2003 was age and because we want to have samples of individuals who are more or
less similar in terms of their capitation payments. Because beneficiaries younger than
65 years old represent a small fraction of MA enrollment (7%), we do not view this
exclusion as a serious problem.

Health status An important variable from this dataset is an individual’s health
status. A health status can be measured in many different ways, and there are
plenty of variables in the MCBS that are related to health status. Because it is
very difficult to include all possible measures separately in the empirical analysis,
we construct a one-dimensional continuous measure of health status. Our measure
of an individual’s health status is expected claims costs if an individual were to be
insured by Medicare Parts A and B. To construct this measure of health status, we use
information on an extensive set of observed health statuses and the realized amount
of Medicare Parts A and B claims for each individual who remained in traditional
Medicare. Because information on Medicare claims is available only for individuals
in traditional Medicare, we have to impute expected claims costs for MA enrollees
using their observed health statuses. Thus, we first estimate equations that relate
Medicare claims costs to an extensive list of health characteristics using beneficiaries
enrolled in traditional Medicare. Then we calculate expected claims costs not only
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for traditional Medicare enrollees, but also for MA enrollees.10 A detailed discussion
on constructing the health status variable is in the Appendix.

Capitation Payment For our analysis, we need to know how much an MA plan
would receive when enrolling a Medicare beneficiary with certain characteristics. Unfortunately, the MCBS does not provide such information. Instead, it contains information on how much an MA plan received for a Medicare beneficiary enrolled in MA.
In order to calculate a capitation payment amount for an enrollee, we exploit the fact
that capitation payments were mostly based on the simple demographic factors for
the years 2000–2003, as described in the previous section.11 First, we regress an actual
capitation payment for an MA enrollee in the MCBS on the enrollee’s demographic
characteristics that are used in the calculation of actual capitation payments. With
coefficient estimates from the regression, we calculate a capitation payment for any
Medicare beneficiary. Because capitation payments depend only on exogenous demographic characteristics, selection bias is not a concern here even though the regression
is run with data on MA enrollees only. The coefficient estimates in the regression are
reported in Table 3. The results show that the variables included in the regression
explain a large part of variation in capitation payments, with R-squared of 0.822.
The estimates are used to calculate a capitation payment amount for all Medicare
beneficiaries including those who chose traditional Medicare.
10

An implicit assumption here is that traditional Medicare and MA enrollees do not differ in
unobserved health status. Given the extensive list of variables on health status used in imputation,
however, it is reasonable to assume that we can capture most of the meaningful differences in health
status.
11
As explained in the previous section on MA, 10% of capitation payments depended on inpatient
claims data for the years 2000–2003. For this version of the paper, we ignore the dependence of
capitation payments on the data, which only accounted for 0.5% of health expenditures Brown et al.
(2012). Given the small role of inpatient data in the calculation of capitation payments, we do not
view the omission as a serious problem.
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3.1.2

Advertising Data

AdSpender contains information on the annual advertising expenditures and quantities of health insurers in different media such as TV, newspaper, and radio in the
100 largest local advertising markets in the U.S. A local advertising market consists
of a major city and its surrounding counties, and its size is comparable to that of a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).12 Advertising quantity is defined as the number
of times an advertisement appeared in a medium in a given period, and this information is only available for TV and newspapers. AdSpender categorizes advertising
across product types whenever specific product information can be detected in an
advertisement, which allows us to isolate advertising expenditures for an insurer’s
MA plan in some instances. For example, some expenditures are reported in detail
(e.g. Humana Gold plan, which is an MA plan offered by Humana Insurance Company), while others are reported more generally (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield health
insurance in general). An advertisement falls into the latter category when it does
not mention product names, or when it is for an insurer itself (not for its specific
products).
In constructing a measure of advertising levels for MA plans, we excluded advertising expenditures specific to insurance products that are not MA plans. Whenever
information on a product is available in the data, for example, we can tell whether the
product was sold in individual or group markets for individuals not on Medicare. In
the end, we use advertising expenditures for MA plans and general advertising expenditures. Because the latter is likely to be meant not only for the Medicare population
but also for the non-Medicare population, we make adjustments for expenditures for
general advertisements, while we do not make any changes to advertising expendi12

In the advertising industry, this local market is usually referred to as a Designated Media Market,
which is defined by Nielsen company.
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g
tures for MA plans. To be more precise, we denote adma
jmt and adjmt as a firm j’s

MA-specific and general advertising expenditures in a local advertising market m in
year t, respectively. Our final measure of advertising expenditures for firm j’s MA
plans in market m in year t, adjmt , is that:
g
adjmt = adma
jmt + ψmt adjmt

where ψmt ∈ [0, 1] is a number we use to adjust adgjmt . An important issue here is the
choice of ψmt . For example, if ψmt = 1, the total advertising spending for MA will
simply be the sum of the two kinds of advertising expenditures, which may overstate
“true” MA advertising spending. For our analysis, we use ψmt equal to the fraction of
the population that is at least 65 years old in each advertising market. Although the
choice of ψmt is not likely to lead to a perfect measure of advertising expenditures for
MA, the choice of ψmt will be a reasonable proxy for the relative importance of MA
business for a firm operating in a local advertising market.13
In our analysis, we do not distinguish between an insurer’s advertising expenditures in different media.14 Instead, we use an insurer’s total advertising expenditure
in a local advertising market by summing the insurer’s advertising expenditures across
all media in the market. In analysis, we also use an insurer’s total advertising quantity.
Because information on advertising quantity is available only for TV and newspaper
advertising, and because a unit of TV advertising is very different from a unit of
newspaper advertising, we measure an insurer’s advertising quantity in terms of TVadvertising-equivalent quantity. We construct this variable by dividing an insurer’s
13

We plan to conduct robustness checks for the choice of ψmt .
We make this choice for two reasons. The first reason is that advertising in different media
does not have very distinctive effects on demand in our preliminary analysis. The second reason is
that because we endogenize advertising choices in the model, and because we simulate advertising
equilibrium in our counterfactual analysis, we did not want to add multiple advertising variables for
which we would need to find new equilibria.
14

14

total advertising expenditures in a local advertising market by the average cost of a
unit of TV advertising in the market.

3.1.3

Plan-level Data

The Medicare Compare Database is released each year to inform Medicare beneficiaries which private insurers are operating in their county, what plans they offer, and
what benefits and costs are associated with each plan. We take a variety of plan
benefit characteristics from the data such as premiums, dental coverage, vision coverage, brand and generic prescription drug coverage, and the copayments associated
with prescription drugs, primary care doctor visits and specialist visits, emergency
room visits, skilled nursing facility stays, and inpatient hospital stays. In addition to
information about plan benefits, the data also provide information from report cards
on MA plan quality.15 We use four measures of plan quality: ease of getting referral
to specialists, overall rating of health plan, overall rating of health care received, and
how well doctors communicate.
The CMS State-County-Plan (SCP) files provide the number of Medicare beneficiaries, number of enrollees of each MA insurer, and average capitation payments
in each county-year. A problem with this dataset is that although many insurers
offer multiple plans in the same county, the aggregate enrollment information is at
the insurer-county-year level, not at the plan-insurer-county-year level. One way to
deal with this issue is by taking the average of characteristics of plans offered by an
insurer as representative characteristics of the insurer; and another approach is to
take the base plan of each MA insurer as a representative plan because the base plan
15
Dafny and Dranove (2008) find that the report cards on MA plan quality had an impact on
demand for MA plans.
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is usually the most popular.16

17

For the current version of this paper, we take the

first approach, and, as a result, each MA insurer will have only one representative
plan available in each county in analysis.

3.2

Preliminary Analysis

In this section, we provide summary statistics from the data and descriptive evidence on how advertising relates to risk selection. Table 4 displays characteristics
of counties depending on total advertising spending in a local advertising market to
which a county belongs. Although there are plenty of counties having no advertising
spending, these counties are small in population. There is also a strong correlation
between advertising and other county-level characteristics. Counties with larger advertising expenditures tend to have a larger fraction of Medicare beneficiaries in MA,
higher capitation payments, higher health care costs in terms of traditional Medicare
reimbursement rates, and more MA insurers.
Table 5 shows the presence of strong incentives for risk selection in MA. A common
pattern observed in this table is that monthly capitation payments do not account for
the large variation in health expenditures across individuals having different health
statuses. MA insurers are paid capitation payments greater than necessary to cover
the health expenditures of relatively healthy individuals whereas capitation payments
16

Previous research on MA also faced the same issue and had to deal with the issue in one of these
ways. For examples, see Hall (2007); Nosal (2012).
17
Another approach taken previously by Lustig (2011) is to use the individual-level data, MCBS.
This dataset contains beneficiaries’ answers to questions about characteristics of MA plans they
chose such as premium paid, whether it provides vision, hearing, prescription drug coverage, etc.
Using this information, Lustig (2011) was able to match plans chosen by individuals in the MCBS
with a specific plan. In the current version of this paper, we do not take this approach for two
reasons. First, information on an individual’s choice of a specific plan is not the most important
information for us given our focus on an individual’s choice of an MA insurer. Second, the approach
requires extensive data work because we have to compare the characteristics of an individual’s plan
to the characteristics of each plan offered by an insurer to match an individual with a specific plan.
However, we plan on conducting robustness checks with this approach later when revising the paper.
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for relatively unhealthy individuals are not sufficient to cover their health expenditures. As a result, MA insurers would have very strong incentives to selectively enroll
healthier individuals in any county. Moreover, there is regional variation in incentives
for risk selection. In counties belonging to local advertising markets with relatively
large advertising spending, enrolling healthy individuals is more profitable, and enrolling unhealthy individuals results in a larger loss.18
In order to investigate incentives for risk selection and their regional variation
more precisely, we run the following regression with the individual-level data:

Overpaymenti = β1 rhi + β2 rhi × capct + β3 capct + Xi γ + i

Overpaymenti is the difference between in individual i’s capitation payment and
health status (measured in terms of expected traditional Medicare claims costs), which
are calculated with the individual-level data; rhi is individual i’s relative health status,
which is defined as a ratio of individual i’s health status to the average Medicare claims
cost in county c where individual i resides in year t; capct is the average capitation
payment in county c in year t; and Xi is a vector of other controls that determine the
capitation payment for individual i such as age, Medicaid status, and institutional
status. Regression results are presented in Table 6. Because the minimum countylevel average capitation payment is larger than 200, β̂1 + β̂2 capct < 0 in any county
in any year. This means that more over-payments will be made in regions having
healthier individuals (lower rhi ). Moreover, β̂2 rhi + β̂3 > 0 for rhi < 0.97, and the
median and mean of rhi are 0.6 and 0.89, respectively. This means that over-payments
18

The regional variation results from the fact that the average and variance of health expenditures
are positively correlated. In a region where health care is more expensive, the average health
expenditure is higher. At the same time, the variance of health expenditures across individuals
is also greater in the region because it is usually the health expenditures of unhealthy individuals
that increase disproportionately more in a more expensive region.
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for relatively healthy individuals are greater in regions with higher average capitation
payments. These results are summarized in Figure 1, which is based on an individual
of age 75 who is not eligible for Medicaid and not living in a nursing home. The plots
show that MA plans can increase profit by enrolling healthier individuals and that
risk selection is more profitable in regions with higher average capitation payments.
Now given that insurers have more incentives for risk selection in regions with
higher capitation payments, we investigate how an insurer’s advertising in a local
adverting market is related to regional variation in capitation payments with the
following regressions:

adjmt = βcapmt + Xmt γ + δj + jmt
adjmt = βcapmt + Xmt γ + ξjm + jmt

The two regressions are different only with respect to fixed effects. In the first specification, δj denotes insurer fixed effects which are invariant over local advertising markets (m). In the second specification, ξjm denotes insurer-advertising market fixed
effects. adjmt is either an advertising quantity or expenditure by insurer j in local
advertising market m in year t, depending on specification.19 capmt is the weighted
average of capct (the average capitation payment in county c in year t) across counties
in local advertising market m, with the population of each county as a weight. Xmt is
a vector of other control variables such as the population of market m, local TV advertising cost and number of competing insurers in an advertising market. The results
are reported in Table 7. For any specification, the results indicate that more advertising is done in local advertising markets with higher average capitation payments,
19

After all, we run four different regressions. Each equation is estimated with each of the two
dependent variables.
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where over-payments for healthy enrollees are greater. That is, MA insurers’ amounts
of advertising respond to regional variation in the profitability of risk selection.
Lastly, Table 8 shows that individuals with different health statuses are likely to be
enrolled with different insurers. MA plans in general tend to have healthier Medicare
beneficiaries than traditional Medicare, which is consistent with previous findings on
selection into MA. Among MA insurers, moreover, firms with more advertising tend
to have healthier enrollees.

4

Model

As discussed in a previous section, MA insurers contract with CMS for each county
(c) in each year (t). As a result, consumers in different counties face different choice
sets. However, each advertising decision is typically made on the basis of a local
advertising market (m), which contains several counties. Thus we assume individuals
in different c but in the same m are exposed to the same advertising level by the same
firm. If county c is included in ad market m, we denote c ∈ m.

4.1

Demand

Consider a consumer i, living in a county c (∈ m) in year t. Consumer i chooses to
enroll with one of the available MA insurers in each c and t or in traditional Medicare.
We assume that consumer i, living in a county c in year t, obtains indirect utility uijct
from insurer j as follows:

uijct = g(adjmt , rhi ; φ) + pjct αi + xjct βi + ξjc + ∆ξjct + ijct
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where

g(adjmt , rhi ; φ) = (φ0 + φ1 log(rhi )) × log(1 + φ2 adjmt );
αi = α0 + α1 log(rhi );
βi = β0 + β1 log(rhi ).

Each insurer has observable characteristics (adjmt , pjct , and xjct ), insurer-county
fixed effect (ξjc ), and an unobservable characteristic (∆ξjct ). First, adjmt denotes
insurer j’s advertising quantity in advertising market m in year t. The effect of
advertising on indirect utility uijct is captured by g(adjmt , rhi ; φ), which depends
on individual i’s relative health status (rhi ).20 Parameter φ0 reflects the effects of
advertising that are independent of an individual’s health status. The effects of
advertising on risk selection are captured by its heterogeneous effects on individuals
with different rhi (φ1 ). We assume that the effects of advertising diminish in its
quantity by assuming that adjt enters g(·) in logarithm. Parameter φ2 determines the
curvature of function g(·).
With this specification of uijct , we assume that advertising affects indirect utility
from an insurer, which is consistent with the persuasive, prestige and signaling effects
of advertising. The persuasive and prestige effects of advertising would directly affect
utility from an insurer, for example, by creating a certain positive image associated
with the insurer (Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker and Murphy 1993). Indeed, many
advertisements for MA show images of seniors living healthy lives: engaging in physically demanding activities like running and golfing (Neuman et al. 1998; Mehrotra
et al. 2006). These advertisements may create a positive image associated with an
20

rhi is defined as a ratio of individual i’s health status (in terms of expected Medicare claims
cost) to the average Medicare expenditure in county c where individual i resides in year t. This
definition of rhi is used in the previous section for preliminary analyses.
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insurer and lead to a higher utility level from a plan of that insurer. The signaling
effects of advertising will affect demand for an insurer through expected utility by
giving a signal about the (unobservable) quality of the insurer (Nelson 1974; Milgrom
and Roberts 1986). Because indirect utility uijct is supposed to capture expected utility from an insurer, g(adjmt , rhi ; φ) will contain both effects of advertising. Another
possible effect of advertising we do not exactly model is the provision of information
about the existence of a product, which is likely to affect an individual’s consideration set. If advertising in MA indeed has such effects, they will be captured as an
increase in g(adjmt , rhi ; φ) because we do not model the effects of advertising on an
individual’s consideration set.21
pjct denotes the premium of plan jct which a consumer pays in addition to the
Medicare Part B premium.22 The effect of pjct on utility is also potentially heterogeneous depending on an individual’s health status. This is captured by parameter α1 .
xjct describes plan jct’s characteristics other than adjmt and pjct . For example, xjct
includes copayments for a variety of medical services such as inpatient care and outpatient doctor visits and variables describing drug coverage, vision coverage, dental
coverage, etc. xjct also includes quality measures of insurers taken from report cards
on MA plan quality. The quality measures included in xjct are ease of getting a referral, overall rating of health care received through a MA plan, and how well doctors
21
Effects of advertising on a consumer’s consideration set would be especially important in an
environment where the number of available insurers is so large that consumers cannot easily know
about available options. In the MA market, however, the number of available insurers is limited for
many individuals. About 40% of Medicare beneficiaries have at most two insurers available in their
county of residence; and about 70% of Medicare beneficiaries have at most four insurers available in
their county of residence. Thus, although the informative effects of advertising can be still important
in the MA market, the effects are not likely to be as important as in markets with a large number
of available products.
22
When enrolling in a MA plan, an individual must pay the Medicare Part B premium as well as
the premium charged by the plan. Here I did not include Medicare Part B premium in pjct because
almost all Medicare beneficiaries, who remain in traditional Medicare, enroll in Medicare Part B and
pay the Medicare Part B premium.
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in a MA plan communicate.23 With these quality measures, we can control for an
insurer’s characteristics that would be usually considered unobserved. The effects of
xjct are potentially heterogeneous with parameter β1 capturing the differential effects
of xjct on individuals having different health statuses.24
ξjc denotes insurer-county fixed effects that capture time-invariant unobserved
characteristics of insurer j in county c such as size and quality of the insurer’s networks in a region. An individual’s utility also depends on aspects of an insurer that
are unobserved by researchers but observed by consumers and insurers. ∆ξjct is a
time-specific deviation from ξjc . ∆ξjct captures time-varying unobserved characteristics and/or shocks to demand for this insurer. We assume that ∆ξjct is known by
consumers and insurers when they make decisions. Lastly, ijct is idiosyncratic preference shock, which we assume is drawn from Type I extreme value distribution and
i.i.d across individuals, insurers, counties and years.
In the model, the outside option is to enroll in traditional Medicare, from which
a consumer receives utility of ui0ct :

ui0ct = zi λ + i0ct .

zi is a vector of an individual’s characteristics including relative health status (rhi ),
age, Medicaid status, and whether the individual receives insurance benefits from
an (former) employer. These individual characteristics in ui0ct will control for the
possibility of different values of the outside option relative to MA, depending on individual characteristics. For example, Medicaid-eligible individuals will receive more
23

A detailed list of the variables used in analysis is reported in the Appendix.
In order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, we do not interact every variable in
xjct with health status. We select which variables to interact with health status based on the results
of the preliminary analysis. A complete list of variables interacted with health status is reported in
the Appendix.
24
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comprehensive coverage in traditional Medicare without having to pay an additional
premium. Those who receive insurance benefits from employers will also have a different value of the outside option compared to individuals only with basic Medicare
Parts A and B coverage. Moreover, many Medicare beneficiaries in traditional Medicare purchase Medicare supplement insurance (so-called Medigap). Medigap is used
in conjunction with traditional Medicare and covers out-of-pocket expenditure risks
of individuals in traditional Medicare.25 Because we do not allow for an additional
choice of purchasing Medigap in the model, the utility from the possibility of purchasing Medigap is included in uioct . Previous research on Medigap finds that selection
into Medigap depends on an individual’s characteristics such as health status (Fang
et al. 2008). Then coefficient λ will also capture heterogeneous preference for Medigap
depending on zi . Moreover, it is possible that individuals have different preferences
for MA. For example, unhealthier individuals may dislike common aspects of MA
plans such as restricted provider networks and referral requirements for specialized
treatments. In this case, parameter λ will also capture heterogeneous preferences for
MA.
With the functional-form assumption on ijct , we can analytically calculate the
probability for an individual i with characteristics z to enroll plan jct. By defining
ujct (zi ) ≡ uijct − ijct , we can write the choice probability for plan jct as follows:

qjct (z) =

exp (ujct (z))
P
exp(u0ct (z)) + k∈Jct exp (ukct (z))

(1)

Then aggregate market share for a firm jct is
ˆ
Qjct =

qjct (z)dFct (z)
z

25

About 25% of Medicare beneficiaries purchase a Medigap plan.
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(2)

where Fct (z) is the distribution of individual characteristics z in county c and year t.

4.2

Supply

We assume that insurers play a simultaneous game in choosing optimal pricing and
advertising in each advertising market. In the model, a pricing decision is made
for each county (c) in each year (t), and an advertising decision is made for each
advertising market (m) in each year (t).
When insuring an individual with health status h (a nominal health expenditure,
not relative health rh) with plan characteristics xjct and market characteristics wct ,
insurer jct expects to incur a marginal cost cjct (h) as follows:

cjct (h) = xjct γ1 + wct γ2 + hγ3 + ψj + ηjct .

(3)

xjct is a vector of plan characteristics which are included in the utility specification of
a consumer such as drug coverage, copayment amounts for a variety of services, etc.
wct includes county characteristics that can potentially influence the cost of providing
insurance, including the number of hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and physicians
in a county. For example, insurers may be able to negotiate lower payments with
providers in markets having a large number of physicians and hospitals (Ho 2009).
Importantly, the marginal cost of insuring a consumer depends on the consumer’s
health status h, and this aspect of cjct (h) creates incentives for risk selection. ψj is
a firm fixed effect that capture different administrative costs and different ways of
delivering health care at the firm level (e.g., Aetna, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Secure
Horizon, etc.). Lastly, ηjct is a firm-county-year-specific shock to marginal costs that
is constant across individuals with different h. We assume that ηjct is observed by all
insurers making pricing and advertising decisions in a market.
24

Insurer j’s profit from a county c in year t, excluding advertising costs, is given
by:

ˆ
(pjct + capct (z) − cjct (h))qjct (z)dFct (z).

πjct = Mct
z

Mct is the population of those who are at least 65 years old in county c in year t,
which is the market size; pjct is the premium charged by insurer j in county c in year t;
capct (z) is a capitation payment that depends on county, year, age, gender, Medicaid
status and institutional status; and qjct (z) is demand for insurer j by an individual
having characteristics z in (1).
Because each insurer makes an advertising decision for each advertising market,
we need to consider an insurer’s profit in an advertising market in order to analyze
its advertising choice. An insurer j’s profit in advertising market m and year t is:

πjmt =

X

πjct − mcjmt adjmt

c∈m

where mcjmt is constant marginal cost per unit of advertising. We assume that

mcjmt = exp xad
jmt γad + ζjmt .
xad
jmt includes the costs of TV advertising in media market m in year t, year dummies,
and dummy variables for large firms. We included eight dummy variables for each
of the eight largest firms. These dummy variables will capture different resources
constraints faced by different firms.26

27

ζjmt is a shock to the marginal cost, which

26

Although marginal cost of advertising is assumed to be constant, some firms using large amounts
of advertising may face different advertising costs due to volume discounts. The dummy variables
can capture the different discounts received by different firms having potentially different advertising
amounts.
27
Included insurers are Secure Horizon, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kaiser Permanente, United Healthcare, Aetna, Humana, Health Net, and Cigna. Although Secure Horizon is currently part of United
Healthcare, they were separate companies during the period of 2000–2003.
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is also known by all insurers in a media market, but unobserved by researchers. We
assume that ζjmt ∼ N (0, σζ2 ).28
Nash equilibrium conditions for the game for insurers are that insurers’ choices
maximize their profits given choices made by other insurers. For an insurer’s optimal
pricing condition, we have the following condition for each pjct :
∂πjct
∂πjmt
=
= 0.
∂pjct
∂pjct

(4)

An insurer’s optimal advertising conditions are:



= 0 for adjmt > 0

X ∂πjct
∂πjmt
.
=
− mcjmt

∂adjmt c∈m ∂adjmt

≤ 0 for adjmt = 0

(5)

For the optimal advertising condition, we explicitly allow for the possibility of the
corner solution, which is no advertising.29 Because about 35% of insurer (j)-market
(m)-year (t) combinations do not advertise at all, we have to explicitly allow for the
possibility that insurers choose the corner solution. Condition (5) states that when
an insurer spends a positive amount of advertising spending, the optimal quantity
of advertising maximizes its profit, and that when an insurer does not advertise, its
profit gain from a small quantity of advertising should not be greater than its cost.
28

The reason that we make a functional-form assumption for ζ will be discussed in the section for
identification and estimation.
29
Although premiums can be zero, we assume that even zero premium satisfies the pricing first
order condition with equality. This assumption is made mainly for computational convenience when
solving the model in counterfactual analysis. If an insurer chooses zero premium due to the constraint
of nonnegative premium, it is possible that we overestimate the marginal cost of providing insurance
for insurers having zero premium.
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5

Identification and Estimation

For the discussion of identification and estimation of the model, we define θ as a
vector that contains all parameters in the model such that θ = (θd , θs ). θd and θs are
vectors of parameters that enter the demand and supply side, respectively.

5.1

Demand

Mean Utility In utility uijct , there are two kinds of parameters: θ1d and θ2d . We
define θ1d to be parameters that enter ‘mean utility’ δjct , which is a part of uijct that
does not depend on individual characteristics. Precisely,

δjct = φ0 log(1 + φ2 adjmt ) + α0 pjct + xjct β0 + ξjc + ∆ξjct .

(6)

θ2d is defined as parameters for interaction terms between insurer characteristics and
individual characteristics. We let φ2 , which determines diminishing returns of advertising effects, be a part of θ2d . Berry et al. (1995) show that given a value for θ2d , there
∗
(θ2d ) that solves for the system of equations given by the aggregate
is a unique δjct

market share equation (2). Then parameter θ1d is estimated using equation 6. A wellknown problem regarding identification of θ1d is that the unobserved characteristic
(∆ξjct ) and two endogenous variables in the model (pjct and adjmt ) are correlated,
because ∆ξjct is assumed to be known by consumers and insurers when they make
decisions. This problem is a typical endogeneity problem, and then a simple ordi∗
nary least squared regression of δjct
(θ2d ) on the observed variables in (6) will result in

inconsistent estimates of θ1d .
Although the endogeneity problem causes challenges in identification, fixed effects
ξjc in δjct would control for a significant part of the unobserved heterogeneity of
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insurers. Important characteristics that are not included in xjct are an insurer’s
network size and quality in a local market. For example, Kaiser Permanente, which
is one of the largest insurers in California, has a more extensive network in California
than in other regions. As long as such characteristics do not vary much over the
time period considered in this paper, they will be controlled for by ξjc . Moreover,
xjct includes an insurer’s quality measures from report cards on MA plan quality,
such as ease of getting a referral, overall rating of an insurer, overall rating of health
care received, and how well an insurer’s physicians communicates with patients. By
including these characteristics, we will be able to control for characteristics that would
usually be considered unobservable.
However, it is still possible that xjct cannot capture all relevant characteristics
of an insurer that vary over time, which will result in the endogeneity problem. A
typical approach to accounting for the endogeneity problem is to use instruments
that are correlated with the endogenous variables, but not with the unobservable.
We construct two sets of instruments. The first set of instruments are the averages of
premiums and advertising of the same parent company in other advertising markets.
The use of functions of endogenous variables in other counties as instruments is a
strategy similar to Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001). Town and Liu (2003) use
similar instruments in estimating a model of demand for MA plans. The identifying
assumption is that demand shock ∆ξjct is not correlated with shocks affecting the
premiums of insurer j in other markets, such as demand and marginal cost shocks
in the markets. A similar identifying assumption is made for advertising of the same
firm in other markets. A premium in a county will be correlated with the average
premiums of the same firm in other markets through, for example, common companylevel components affecting premiums. The same argument also holds for advertising.
The second set of instruments are variables that affect a plan’s premium and ad28

vertising choices, but do not affect utility directly. One such variable is the cost of
a unit of TV advertising in a local advertising market, which affects an advertising
decision, but does not affect utility directly. Other such variables are capitation payments in other counties in the same advertising market. Because capitation payments
in other counties in the same advertising market will affect advertising in the advertising market, the payments in other counties can be valid instruments as long as they
do not enter the utility of a consumer in a county.30
Resulting moment conditions employed in the estimation are:

E[∆ξjct |Γ] = 0.

(7)

Γ is a set of instruments that includes the aforementioned two sets of instruments as
well as xjct .
Preference Heterogeneity Important information for identification of parameters
for preference heterogeneity θ2d is an individual’s insurer choice from the MCBS (the
individual-level data). Parameter θ2d will be identified by variation in the characteristics of insurers chosen by individuals having different characteristics. Identification
of θ2d is aided by variation in insurer characteristics, not only across insurers within
a region but also across regions. For example, advertising quantities vary across local advertising markets depending on how profitable risk selection is in the market,
as illustrated in the previous section for preliminary analysis. Moreover, individuals
in different regions will have different choice sets, and this variation in choice sets
provides information on the substitution patterns of different individuals.
An important parameter in θ2d is the parameter that determines the heterogeneous
30

The second instrument using capitation payments in other counties is similar to the instruments
used in Nosal (2012), who studies demand for MA plans.
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effect of advertising depending on an individual’s health status (φ1 ), which captures
the effect of advertising on risk selection. A potential concern in identifying φ1 is that
there may be insurer characteristics, not included in xjct but correlated with adjmt ,
that have different effects on the demand of individuals having different health status.
Given the available data, it is impossible to allow for insurer-county fixed effects ξjc
that depend on an individual’s health status and to control for them.31 In order to
alleviate this concern, we interact many different variables in xjct with health status,
including not only usual characteristics such as drug coverage and copayments but
also the quality measures from report cards on MA plans and dummy variables for
each of the seven largest insurers. The latter variables are highly correlated with
adjmt , and their interactions with health status will limit the role of omitted insurer
characteristics that can have differential effects on individuals having different health
statuses. The quality measures will control for important aspects of insurers, with
potential heterogeneous effect, that cannot be described by usual coverage characteristics. Moreover, an interaction between a dummy variable for a large insurer and
health status will capture an aspect of the insurer that may have differential effects
on individuals having different health statuses.
In order to construct micro-moments for an individual’s insurer choice and combine
them with aggregate moments (7), we use the score of the log-likelihood function for
a choice by an individual observed in the MCBS, as in Imbens and Lancaster (1994).
The likelihood function for an individual’s choice is:

L=

Y

qjct (zi )dijct

i,j,c,t
31

If there is information on an insurer’s aggregate market share by different health statuses, it is
possible to allow for ξjc that depends on health status.
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where zi is a vector of characteristics of individual i in the individual-level data; and
dijct is an indicator variable that equals one when individual i chooses plan jct. Then
our micro-moments are
∂ log(L)
= 0.
∂θ2d

5.2

(8)

Supply

Cost of Providing Insurance Estimation of parameters of the supply side relies on the optimality conditions for pricing and advertising, presented in (4) and
(13). The first order condition for optimal pricing (4) is equivalent to the following
condition:

Qjct +

´
z

(pjct + capct (z))

∂qjct (z)
dFct (z)
∂pjct

∂Qjct
∂pjct

´
=

∂q (z)
c (h) ∂pjctjct dFct (z)
z jct
∂Qjct
∂pjct

= xjct γ1 + wct γ2 + H(qjct , Fct )γ3
+ψj + ηjct

(9)
(10)

where qjct (z) and Qjct are demand of an individual with characteristic z (which includes h) and aggregate demand for insurer j in county c in year t, respectively;
and

´
H(qjct , Fct ) ≡

z

h

∂qjct (z)
dFct (z)
∂pjct
.
∂Qjct
∂pjct

An examination of (9) reveals that its left-hand side is a function of demand side
parameters and data. Because demand side parameters can be identified with only
the demand model and data, the left-hand side of (9) can be treated as known.
Then optimality condition (9) leads to a linear estimating equation. Because we
assume that an insurer’s choice of xjct is exogenous to the model, and because market
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characteristics wct are exogenous, we have the following moment conditions:

E[ηjct |xjct ] = 0 and E[ηjct |wct ] = 0.

(11)

These assumptions will identify parameters γ1 and γ2 .
However, we cannot have a similar condition for parameter γ3 because H(qjct , Fct )
is potentially endogenous to ηjct . Because an insurer’s choice of pjct will be directly
dependent on ηjct in the model, and because pjct will determine qjct (z), variable
H(qjct , Fct ) may be correlated with ηjct . This endogeneity problem necessitates an
instrument that is correlated with H(qjct , Fct ), but not with ηjct . In order to find
an instrument for H(qjct , Fct ), it is important to understand what H(qjct , Fct ) means.
By definition, H(qjct , Fct ) measures the average health status of consumers switching from insurers jct to other insurers due to an increase in a premium of insurer
jct. Because an individual’s health status h is measured as expected claims cost for
Medicare Parts A and B, an important determinant of H(qjct , Fct ) is overall health
care cost in county c in year t. As a result, H(qjct , Fct ) must be highly correlated
with county-level average Medicare claims cost F F Sct , which exhibits large variation
across counties. Since we control for market characteristics wct that may influence an
insurer’s marginal cost, it is likely that F F Sct is uncorrelated with ηjct , which leads
to the identifying assumption for γ3 such that

E[ηjct |F F Sct ] = 0.

(12)

Advertising Cost The optimality condition for an advertising quantity (5) identifies parameter γad in advertising marginal cost mcjmt . This condition is equivalent
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to the following condition:

ζjmt


P


= log

∂πjct
c∈m ∂adjmt

P


≥ log
c∈m

∂πjct
∂adjmt



− xad
jmt γad

for adjmt > 0



xad
jmt γad

for adjmt = 0

−

(13)

As is clear in (13), the optimality condition for insurers using zero advertising results
in an inequality condition, which creates a challenge in estimation and identification.
We deal with this problem by assuming a functional form for the distribution for
advertising cost shock ζjmt such that ζjmt ∼ N (0, σζ2 ).32
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In order to set up moment

conditions, we use the score of the log-likelihood function for each insurer’s observed
advertising quantity choice, using the first order conditions (13). The likelihood
function for the advertising choice is:

Γ=

Y

1[adjmt =0]
∗
∗
fζ (ζjmt
)1[adjmt >0] 1 − Fζ (ζjmt
)

j,m,t

where

∗
ζjmt

= log

P

∂πjct
c∈m ∂adjmt



− xad
jmt γad , and fζ and Fζ are the pdf and cdf of ζ.

Then the moment conditions for advertising cost are
∂ log(Γ)
= 0
∂γad
∂ log(Γ)
= 0.
∂σζ

(14)

An alternative approach, not taken in this paper, is to set-identify γad using the
moment inequality method as in Pakes et al. (2011), which will result in an upper
32

Goeree (2008) faces the same problem of rationalizing zero advertising by some firms in the personal computer market, and she also deals with this problem by making a functional-form assumption
for the unobservable.
33
Note that a function-form assumption is not necessary for η when estimating the parameters in
the marginal cost of providing insurance because there are no inequality optimality conditions for
pricing.
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and lower bound for γad . If the moment inequality method is used, it will be straightforward to calculate a lower bound by calculating an increase in profits (excluding
advertising cost) when insurers increase a unit of advertising from the amount observed in the data. Marginal cost of advertising must be greater than the calculated
increase in profits because the observed advertising quantity is assumed to maximize
profits. A moment for a lower bound is calculated by averaging over each insurer’s
lower bounds for advertising cost.
A natural way to derive an upper bound of advertising cost is to calculate the
decrease in profits when insurers decrease a unit of advertising from the observed advertising choice. However, deriving the upper bound is more challenging in this model
because some insurers choose zero advertising and because an advertising quantity
cannot be negative. As a result, we can calculate upper bounds only for insurers that
choose positive advertising quantities. Because we can only average over insurers
with positive advertising for a moment for the upper bound, we will have a selection
problem. However, Pakes et al. (2011) show that if a researcher assumes that ζ comes
from a symmetric distribution, it is still possible to derive an upper bound.
A tradeoff between the two approaches to dealing with the inequality first order
conditions is that a functional-form assumption on ζ can lead to point-identification
of parameters at the cost of a stronger assumption on unobservable ζ. However, the
moment inequality method is not completely free of an assumption on ζ either. For
this reason, we choose to make a functional-form assumption.34
34

For robustness checks, we plan to check how our results depend on different assumptions on ζ
and to estimate the model with the moment inequality method.
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5.3

Estimation Algorithm

The demand and supply models are estimated separately in two steps. The estimation
method we use is generalized method of moments. First, we estimate the demand
model using moments (7) and (8) with the nested fixed point algorithm as in Berry
et al. (1995). We define Gd (θd ) to be a vector of the moments for the demand side.
Our criterion function is given by Ψd (θd ) = Gd (θd )0 W Gd (θd ) where W is a weighting
matrix. Our estimation routine searches for θd that minimizes Ψd (θd ). Evaluation of
Gd (θd ) can be broken into the following steps for each choice of θd :
∗
1. Given θd , we solve for mean utility δ ∗ (θd ) = {δjct
(θd )}j,c,t that satisfies the

conditions for aggregate market shares (2), using the contraction mapping used
in Berry et al. (1995).
2. With θd and δ ∗ (θd ), we calculate the demand qjct (z) of an individual with characteristic z using equation (1).
3. We evaluate Gd (θd ) with qjct (z).
Once we estimate θd , the supply model is estimated using moments (11), (12), and
(14).

6
6.1

Estimates
Utility

Table 9 displays estimates for the parameters of primary interest. The estimate of the
parameter for the differential effects of advertising on utility is negative, which means
that the effects of advertising are greater for healthier consumers because a healthier
individual has lower rhi . The total effect of advertising on an individual with relative
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health status rhi is φ0 + φ1 log(rhi ). In the data, the median of log(rhi ) is -0.6, and
the value of log(rhi ) is negative for a majority of individuals.35 As a result, although
the estimate for φ0 is not large enough to be statistically significant, φ0 + φ1 log(rhi )
will be larger than φ0 for many individuals with log(rhi ) < 0. Moreover, less healthy
individuals receive more utility from the outside option than healthier individuals,
according to the estimates for the parameters for relative health status in the utility
for the outside option. In other words, healthier individuals are more likely to choose
MA than less healthy individuals even without advertising. The estimates for price
coefficients indicate that individuals receive negative utility from a higher premium,
and that healthier individuals are less sensitive to premium although the estimate for
α1 is not statistically significant.
Table 10 presents semi-elasticities of demand with respect to an increase of $1,000
in advertising expenditures, which measures percentage change in demand for a $1,000
increase in advertising expenditures.36 An increase of $1,000 in advertising expenditures by an insurer increases demand by 0.063% on average. Elasticities for different
health statuses show that the effects of advertising are substantially different across
individuals having different health statuses. The elasticity for an individual whose
rhi is lower than the 25th-percentile of the distribution of rhi is more than four times
greater than the elasticity for an individual, whose rhi is more than the 75th-percentile
of the distribution of rhi . Semi-elasticity of demand with respect to a premium is
-0.25, which means that a dollar increase in a premium decreases demand by 0.25%.
Moreover, healthier individuals’ price semi-elasticity is larger in its absolute value
than that of less healthy individuals.
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The distribution of rh has a long right-tail. The median of rh is 0.6, and the mean of rh is 0.9.
We calculate semi-elasticity instead of elasticity because zero advertising is observed for about
35% of insurers. When an advertising expenditure is zero, elasticity becomes zero. For the same
reason, we calculate semi-elasticity for premiums. MA insurers often charge a premium of zero.
36
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The estimates imply that although MA plans are preferred by healthy individuals
in general, advertising reinforces the direction of selection into MA. As mentioned in
a previous section, unhealthy individuals may dislike the HMO aspects of MA plans
such as restricted provider networks and referral requirements for specialized medical treatment. These aspects will be especially inconvenient especially for unhealthy
individuals, who expect to utilize medical care intensively. In addition to the heterogeneous preferences between healthy and unhealthy individuals for MA, advertising
also attracts healthier individuals into MA.
There are several mechanisms to generate the estimated heterogeneous effects of
advertising on demand. First, the estimates may reflect contents of advertising designed to be more appealing to healthy individuals, as claimed by Neuman et al.
(1998) and Mehrotra et al. (2006). Alternatively, insurance companies may deliberately choose which media to advertise because individuals with different characteristics may be exposed to different media to different degrees. For example, more
educated individuals are more likely to read a newspaper, and insurers may target
these individuals with newspaper advertising because more educated individuals tend
to be healthier.37 Another possibility is that individuals with different health statuses
respond differently to the same advertising. In order for an insurer’s advertising to
induce an individual to enroll with the insurer, the individual must be able to purchase a plan from the insurer. In fact, many Medicare beneficiaries have difficulties
with activities related to purchasing a plan according to the individual-level data:
About 10% of Medicare beneficiaries have difficulties in using the telephone; about
20% of them have difficulties in shopping for personal items; about 15% of them
37

An example of research that studies the effects of advertising in different media on individuals
with different characteristics is Goeree (2008), who studies advertising in the U.S. personal computer
market. We are unable to incorporate this detailed mechanism of risk selection into our analysis
because of the lack of data that relate an individual’s characteristics and media consumption patterns.
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have difficulties in managing money; and about 50% of them do not use the Internet.
Moreover, individuals with such characteristics are more likely to be unhealthy in the
data. Then individuals without the difficulties who would be induced by advertising
are likely to be relatively healthy.
Estimates for other parameters in utility are reported in Table 11 and 12. Many
variables that enter mean utility are statistically significant. For example, consumers
prefer insurers that offer generic and brand drug coverage and drug coverage without
an annual coverage limit. However, many variables that interact with health status
are not statistically significant. Exceptions are the coefficients for Medicaid status and
whether an individual receives health insurance benefits from a (former) employer,
which determine heterogeneous utility of the outside option. As expected, individuals
on Medicaid are less likely to purchase a MA plan; and individuals with employersponsored benefits are also less likely to purchase MA. These estimates result from
the fact that having either option usually increases the value of staying in traditional
Medicare. Medicaid, combined with Medicare, provides more generous coverage than
traditional Medicare, without an additional premium. Moreover, employer-sponsored
benefits also provide a cheap option for supplemental coverage without MA plans.
The imprecise estimates for the parameters for most interaction terms imply that
many plan characteristics do not have large impacts on the insurer choice of individuals with different health statuses. This may be because variation in the data
that identifies the relevant parameters comes from observed insurer choices, not plan
choices, by individuals with different health statuses. Even if individuals with different health statuses select into plans with different characteristics within an insurer, an
observed insurer choice cannot provide information on such selection patterns unless
the characteristics of overall plans of different insurers are very different.38 However,
38

As a robustness check, we plan to consider the possibility that individuals make a choice at the
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parameters for the effects of insurer-level characteristics, such as advertising quantities and dummy variables for large insurers, will not be affected by our focus on an
individual’s choice of insurer because these characteristics are constant across each
insurer’s plans.

6.2

Cost

Table 13 displays estimates for marginal costs of providing insurance to an enrollee
whose specification is given in (3). The most important parameter here is the coefficient for health status, which is measured as expected Medicare reimbursement
costs. The coefficient is very precisely estimated, and its effect is that a one-dollar
increase in expected Medicare claims cost leads to an increase of $0.86 for an MA
insurer. This means that the average health status of an insurer’s enrollees is an
important determinant of the insurer’s cost of providing insurance, which will create
strong incentives to risk-select healthy individuals.
The marginal cost of providing insurance also depends on other characteristics.
Notably, county-level characteristics are important determinants of marginal cost. We
find that marginal cost increases with population density and with the percentage of
the population that lives in urban areas. It may be because counties, which are
densely populated and urban, are usually more expensive to operate in. Moreover,
the higher the number of hospital beds and skilled nursing facilities, the lower the
marginal cost, which is consistent with the finding that these factors determine the
relative bargaining power of managed-care firms when setting reimbursement rates to
providers (Ho 2009).
Table 14 presents estimates for marginal costs of advertising. The estimates show
that local TV advertising costs increase an insurer’s marginal cost of advertising and
plan-level, not at the insurer-level. See footnote 17 for details.
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that different firms potentially have different costs of advertising, possibly because
the firms face different resource constraints..

7

Counterfactual Experiments

With the estimated model, we conduct counterfactual analyses to understand the
impacts of advertising on the MA market and how incentives for risk selection affect
insurers’ advertising decisions.

7.1

Ban of Advertising

In this counterfactual analysis, we simulate an equilibrium of the model where advertising is banned. The simulation has two purposes. First, we investigate how
advertising affects the choices made by consumers and insurers, and how it affects
over-payments by the government. Second, we study how much advertising can account for the selection of healthier individuals into MA.
In implementing this counterfactual analysis, we force each insurer’s advertising
quantity to zero and let insurers re-optimize their premiums. The results are presented
in Table 15. We refer to the observed equilibrium in the data as the baseline. The
ban on advertising decreases overall MA enrollment by 4% and decreases demand
for insurers having above-average advertising expenditures in the baseline by 9%.
Although a decrease in demand would usually lead to a lower premium, the ban on
advertising does not have a large effect on premiums, which decrease by less than a
dollar on average. The negligible effect of advertising on premiums results from the
fact that advertising attracts relatively healthy individuals, which lower the costs of
providing insurance. With the ban, MA enrollees become less healthy on average,
resulting in a larger increase in average health expenditures for insurers having a
40

relatively large amount of advertising in the baseline. For these insurers, an increase
in average expected Medicare claims cost is about $14, which is about 43% of the
average premium charged by these insurers. Such an increase in the cost of providing
insurance will offset incentives to lower premiums that result from the reduction in
demand caused by the lack of advertising.
Table 16 presents the results on consumers’ welfare. We calculate two different
measures of consumers’ surplus. In the first measure, we include the effects of advertising on utility whereas we exclude these effects in the second measure. The first
measure of welfare is consistent with the informative and complementary view of advertising.39 The informative view holds that advertising provides information about
the existence of a product or (unobserved) characteristics of a product that is difficult
to be unobserved before consuming the product. As mentioned in the section for the
demand model, the effect of advertising on indirect utilities in the model will capture
an increase in expected utility due to advertising.40 The complementary view holds
that consumers receive a higher utility from a product when the product is advertised,
which reflects a positive image or greater prestige generated by advertising (Stigler
and Becker 1977; Becker and Murphy 1993). Therefore, according to these views, advertising will have a direct impact on an individual’s indirect utility from an insurer.
When consumers’ surplus is calculated according to these views of advertising, we
find that consumer welfare decreases because consumers do not receive utility from
advertising with the ban and because the ban does not reduce premiums much. The
second measure of welfare is supposed to capture the part of utility derived from
insurer characteristics other than advertising, which is consistent with the persuasive
39

For a discussion of different views of advertising and their welfare implications, see a survey by
Bagwell (2007).
40
For examples, see Stigler (1961); Nelson (1974); Butters (1977); Schmalensee (1977); Grossman
and Shapiro (1984); Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984); and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
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view of advertising. This view holds that advertising does not add any real value to
consumers (Bagwell, 2007). When consumers’ welfare is calculated according to the
persuasive view, we find that advertising increases consumers’ welfare because advertising just distorts a consumer’s decision according to the persuasive view. However,
the welfare could have increased even more if the ban on advertising had decreased
premiums by a greater amount.
Now we turn to the second purpose of this counterfactual analysis, which is to
investigate how much advertising accounts for the selection of healthier individuals
into MA (which is called “advantageous selection”, as opposed to adverse selection).
In the baseline, MA enrollees are healthier than traditional Medicare enrollees. According to Table 17, the average health status of enrollees in traditional Medicare,
in terms of Medicare claims cost, is higher than that of MA enrollees by $60.6. The
difference in average health status between the two groups decreases by 15% with the
ban on advertising. This means that advertising accounts for 15% of advantageous
selection into MA, and that the rest of the selection can be explained by preference
heterogeneity for MA plans. In other words, although preference heterogeneity is a
more important determinant of advantageous selection into MA, advertising by MA
insurers reinforces the direction of selection.
Because advertising reinforces advantageous selection into MA, it leads to overpaying of capitation payments to MA plans. In the data, MA plans are over-paid even
for a random Medicare beneficiary, as reported in Table 16. A reason for this overpayment is that capitation payments were higher than average traditional Medicare
costs during this period. Moreover, capitation payments are calculated based on
Medicare costs of beneficiaries in traditional Medicare, who are less healthy than MA
enrollees. Because over-payments exist even with a random selection into MA, we
calculate additional over-payments caused by a non-random selection into MA and
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compare how these additional over-payments change with the ban on advertising. We
find that advertising accounts for 19% of additional over-payments per MA enrollee,
and that the rest of the average additional over-payment is attributable to preference
heterogeneity between healthy and unhealthy individuals for MA.

7.2

Risk Adjustment

In this counterfactual analysis, we simulate the effects of a perfectly risk-adjusted
capitation payment on the MA market equilibrium in order to investigate how incentives for risk selection affect an insurer’s choices. A perfectly risk-adjusted capitation
payment is a capitation payment that perfectly accounts for variation in health expenditures across individuals having different health statuses. In this counterfactual
analysis, let cap
f ct (h) denote the new capitation payment in county c in year t that
directly depends on an individual’s health status h in terms of Medicare claims cost.
We assume that:
cap
f ct (h) = h + constct .

(15)

That is, the difference between a capitation payment to an MA insurer and an individual’s health status is constant for individuals having different health statuses.
An important choice we need to make in this counterfactual analysis is the choice
of constct because it determines the overall generosity of a capitation payment. In
order to make the results of this counterfactual analysis comparable to the baseline,
we choose constct to be the average of the over-payments per MA enrollee in each
county-year in the baseline. That is, noting that capct (z) is a capitation payment in
the baseline that depends on individual characteristic z,

constct = E[capct (z) − h|dct (z) = 1].
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Expectation is taken over individual characteristics z, and dct (z) is an indicator that
equals one if an individual with characteristic z chooses any MA plan in county c in
year t in the baseline. This new capitation payment structure changes amounts of
over-payments for individuals with different h but keeps the average over-payment
unchanged.
We simulate insurers’ premiums and advertising quantities in the new environment, and the results are presented in Table 18. The risk-adjusted capitation payments have large effects on insurers’ choices. The average advertising expenditure
decreases by 30.7%, and the average premium increases from $32.4 to $51.1. The
results are similar for insurers whose advertising expenditures were above the average
in the baseline. The average advertising expenditure by these insurers decreases by
27.8%, and the average premium increases from $32.4 to $63.5.
The large decrease in advertising expenditure results from a decrease in marginal
profits from enrolling healthy individuals. With the perfect risk-adjustment considered in this counterfactual analysis, capitation payments decrease for healthy individuals and increase for unhealthy individuals. Because advertising has a greater
effect on healthier individuals, the perfect risk-adjustment will result in a decrease in
marginal profit from an additional unit of advertising, which will lead to a decrease
in advertising spending. This finding highlights the importance of risk selection in
driving incentives for MA insurers to advertise.
The decrease in revenues from healthy individuals due to the perfect risk-adjustment
also leads to increases in premiums. Given our finding that healthy individuals prefer
MA more than less healthy individuals even without advertising, MA enrollees are
relatively healthy even with the lower advertising expenditure caused by the perfect
risk-adjustment. Because the risk-adjustment reduces revenues from enrolling healthy
individuals for MA insurers, the insurers increase premiums to compensate for the
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decrease in revenues. Another factor that contributes to the increase in premiums is
that unhealthier individuals are less sensitive to premiums. Because unhealthy individuals now become more profitable to insure, insurers will have incentives to increase
premiums to exploit their relative insensitivity to premiums.
Due to the decrease in advertising and the increase in premiums, overall MA enrollment decreases by about 9%, and MA enrollees become less healthy on average.
The average over-payment per MA enrollee does not change very much because the
constant term in (15) was chosen to be equal to the average over-payment in the
baseline. However, the average over-payment for insurers having above-average advertising in the baseline decreases because their enrollees are healthier than those of
other insurers because they still advertise more than other insurers even in the new
environment. The increase in premiums results in a reduction in consumers’ welfare,
which is presented in Table 19. Because the magnitude of the increase in premiums is
large, consumers’ welfare decreases, regardless of individual health status and whether
we include the effects of advertising on utility. The changes in insurers’ choices due
to the risk-adjustment also leads to a less healthy pool of MA enrollees, which results
in a decrease in the difference in health status between enrollees in MA and enrollees
in traditional Medicare by 11%. Lastly, the average additional over-payment in the
new environment does not change because the constant term in (15) was chosen to
match the average over-payment in the baseline.

8

Conclusion

This is the first paper to quantify the effects of advertising on risk selection and
competition in health insurance markets and to investigate how incentives for risk
selection affect insurers’ advertising expenditures. We document strong incentives for
45

risk selection by insurance companies in MA due to an imperfect risk adjustment of
capitation payments, and we also show how the incentives for risk selection vary over
different regions. We present descriptive evidence that MA insurers advertise more
in regions where risk selection is more profitable. For the main analysis, we develop
and structurally estimate an equilibrium model that incorporates strategic advertising by insurers. The estimates suggest that advertising increases overall demand
with a larger effect on healthier individuals. With a counterfactual analysis where
advertising is banned, we find that advertising accounts for 15% of the selection of
healthier individuals into MA. By reinforcing the selection of healthier individuals
into MA, advertising reduces the costs of MA insurers and keeps premiums from increasing although advertising increases demand for MA insurers. By implementing a
perfectly risk-adjusted capitation payment, moreover, we also find that incentives for
risk selection can account for about 30% of advertising spending in the data, which
highlights an important link between advertising and risk selection.
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Chapter II

Consumer Search Frictions,
Competition and Adverse Selection
in Health Insurance Markets:
Evidence from Medigap
1

Introduction

Medicare is the universal, public health insurance for Americans aged 65 and older.
There also exist markets for private health plans that supplement Medicare, including
Medicare Supplement (Medigap), Medicare Advantage and Medicare Part D. About
50% of Medicare beneficiaries purchase at least one of these plans. A well-functioning
of these private markets depends on consumers’ ability to make informed decisions
based on comparison-shopping, which will foster competition among insurance companies. However, many Medicare beneficiaries have diminished cognitive capacities
associated with aging (Fang et al., 2008), and only about 50% of them have ever used
the Internet.41 Such consumer search frictions are likely to influence the decisions of
Medicare beneficiaries in the markets for private health plans.
A popular type of private health plan for Medicare beneficiaries is Medicare Supplement insurance, also called Medigap, which covers out-of-pocket expenditures from
Medicare. Indeed, the market for Medigap shows an indication of search frictions.
41

Source: the author’s calculation from Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2003–2005
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Although Medigap plans are homogenous by regulation, Medigap premiums are not
only highly dispersed, but also charged well above claims (Maestas et al. 2009; Lin
and Wildenbeest 2013; Starc 2012). These findings are consistent with predictions by
theoretical search models that search frictions lead to the price dispersion of homogeneous products and firms charging prices above their costs.42 The goal of this paper
is to investigate how search frictions affect consumers’ choice, insurers’ pricing and
welfare in the Medigap market.
A potential correlation between health status and search cost needs to be considered in studying the effects of search frictions in the Medigap market. Compared
to healthy individuals, less healthy individuals tend not to use the Internet and/or
have diminished cognitive capacities.43 If unhealthy individuals tend to have high
search costs, then these individuals are more likely to make less ideal choices, i.e.,
purchasing an otherwise identical plan with a higher premium or not purchasing a
Medigap plan. In contrast, healthy individuals are more likely to purchase cheaper
Medigap plans. Therefore, a correlation between health status and search frictions
will determine which type of individuals (healthy vs. unhealthy) enroll in a given
Medigap plan. Because a regulation in the Medigap market prohibits insurers from
charging different premiums based on health statuses, a premium will ultimately depend on the composition of the health statuses of the enrollees in a given plan, which
is influenced by search frictions.
For the main analysis, I develop and structurally estimate an equilibrium model of
the market, incorporating consumer search frictions and their correlation with health
status. On the demand side, a consumer’s preference for a Medigap plan depends on
42

For examples, see Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and McAfee (1983), and Stahl (1989).
Evidence for the correlation between the Internet use and health status will be presented in the
section for descriptive statistics in this paper. For evidence regarding cognitive ability, see Fang
et al. (2008).
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the plan’s characteristics and the consumer’s characteristics including health status
as well as other demographic characteristics. In the model, a consumer does not
necessarily have the full information about the entire Medigap plans and incurs search
cost to expand a choice set. In addition, I allow for the possibility that an individual’s
search cost depend on the individual’s health status. On the supply side, Medigap
insurers choose the optimal premiums to maximize profits given other insurers’ pricing
decisions. A plan’s costs depend on health statuses of its enrollees, and thus an
insurer’s pricing decision takes into account its impact on types of consumers that
would enroll with the insurer.
I estimate the model with firm-level and individual-level data. The firm-level data
provide information on plan characteristics, aggregate market shares, and average
cost of claims incurred for each plan. The individual-level data provide information
on demographic characteristics and whether an individual has a Medigap plan. The
estimates show that search frictions are significant, and unhealthy individuals are
more likely to have higher search costs. Those with “excellent” or “very good” selfreported health status forgo about 16% of an average premium due to search frictions,
whereas those whose health status is “good” or below forgo an amount as large as an
average premium. As a result, the unhealthy are more likely than healthier individuals
to skip purchasing a Medigap plan even though the estimates suggest that they have
a higher willingness to pay for Medigap coverage. I also find that although search
frictions give firms an incentive to raise premiums by making demand inelastic, high
search costs of the unhealthy lower a premium.
Using the estimated model, I simulate the effects of a policy that reduces search
frictions by providing consumers with information about available options in the Medigap market. With this policy, I assume that a consumer becomes fully aware of all
available options. In a partial equilibrium setting where premiums are fixed at the
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level observed in the data, all consumers in the market benefit from this new policy
because of the larger choice set induced by the policy. When I allow for Medigap
plans to adjust their premiums in response to this policy, however, I find that not
every consumer benefits. Because search costs are larger for the unhealthy, who have
a higher willingness to pay for a Medigap plan, the policy induces adverse selection
into the Medigap market. As a result, the overall price for Medigap increases although
the demand becomes more elastic without search frictions. Overall Medigap enrollment increases, but the increase mostly comes from the unhealthy. The welfare of
the healthy decreases slightly, whereas that of the unhealthy substantially increases.
These findings suggests that efforts to increase access to information on available
choices should be accompanied by a policy that reduces the effects of the subsequent
adverse selection.
This paper builds on prior work that empirically studies demand for insurance
plans and competition in health insurance markets.44 Among many previous works,
this paper is closely related to Starc (2012), who studies adverse selection and imperfect competition in the Medigap market. She focuses on adverse selection in the
intensive margin, which refers to the selection of less healthy individuals into an otherwise identical plans charging a higher premium. By estimating a model of the
Medigap market without considering search frictions, she finds that less healthy individuals are less sensitive to premiums, which explains the observed adverse selection
in the intensive margin. This paper is different from Starc (2012) because of its
consideration of search frictions and because of its focus on selection in both the intensive and extensive margin. The observed adverse selection in the intensive margin
can be explained by a correlation between search cost and health status. Moreover,
44

For examples in this literature, see Bajari et al. (2011); Bundorf et al. (2012); Carlin and Town
(2007); Cohen and Einav (2007); Dafny and Dranove (2008); Einav et al. (2010a,b); Nosal (2012);
Town and Liu (2003).
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the correlation can also explain the selection of healthier individuals into the Medigap market in the extensive margin (Fang et al., 2008), which is not a main focus of
Starc (2012). Another closely related paper in the literature is Handel (2011), who
studies an interaction between switching cost and adverse selection in the context of
employer-based health insurance markets. Although he also studies a similar type of
frictions in a health insurance market, Handel’s framework lacks competition between
insurance companies, which is an important element defining the Medigap market.
This paper also contributes to a body of literature that empirically investigates
adverse selection in insurance markets. Standard models on insurance markets usually
predict adverse selection, which means that riskier consumers choose more comprehensive plans, causing the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise (e.g., Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1976). However, previous research often finds evidence against adverse
selection. For example, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) do not find evidence for adverse
selection in a market for automobile insurance. Moreover, Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006) and Fang et al. (2008) find that individuals with lower risks are more likely to
purchase long-term care insurance and Medigap, respectively. This pattern of selection is called advantageous selection, and primary reasons for advantageous selection
are that an individual’s characteristics other than risks also determine an insurance
purchase decision, and that these characteristics are often correlated with risks in
a way that results in advantageous selection. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and
Fang et al. (2008) find that risk aversion and diminished cognitive abilities are such
characteristics, respectively. Based on the result on cognitive ability found by Fang
et al. (2008), this papers considers a consumer’s search cost and its correlation with
health status as an explanation for the observed advantageous selection in the Medigap market.
This paper is also related to the literature on consumer search frictions. Most
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of existing theoretical and empirical papers on consumer search frictions have not
considered the possibility that an individual’s search cost is correlated with the individual’s characteristics that have a direct impact on a firm’s cost.45 Even previous
research that studies the Medigap market with consumer search frictions do not consider the possibility (e.g., Maestas et al. 2009; Lin and Wildenbeest 2013). Without
the correlation between search cost and health status, the effects of search frictions
will be just limited to the size of demand. Then a model without the correlation will
not be able to take into account the potential effects of search frictions on a firm’s
cost and its subsequent equilibrium response.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Medigap market in
greater detail and presents descriptive statistics from data. Section 3 outlines the
model, and Section 4 describes identification and estimation of the model . Section
5 and 6 provides the estimates and model fits, respectively. Section 6 presents counterfactual policy analysis which studies the role of search frictions in the Medigap
market, and Section 7 concludes.

2
2.1

The Medigap Market and Data
The Medigap Market

Medicare provides health insurance coverage for people who are 65 and older in
the U.S. However, it has substantial cost-sharing provisions such as deductibles, coinsurance and copayments. For example, Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient
services, requires 20% copayments for services with no stop-loss. As a result, Medi45

For examples of theoretical works, see Burdett and Judd (1983); Carlson and McAfee (1983);
Stahl (1989). For examples of empirical works, see Allen et al. (2012); De los Santos et al. (2012);
Hong and Shum (2006); Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004)
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care beneficiaries still face a large amount of out-of-pocket medical expenditure risks,
and Medigap insurance arose to meet the demand to cover the gap in coverage of
Medicare.
An important feature of the Medigap market is that Medigap plans are homogeneous by regulation. With the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Medigap plans were standardized as in Figure 2. Each plan falls into one
of ten types – labeled plans A though J.46 Medigap plans of different types differ
in insurance coverage. As clear in Figure 2, a Medigap plan A provides the least
generous coverage, and a Medigap plan J provides the most comprehensive coverage. However, Medigap plans are contractually identical within each type. Plans of
the same type do not only offer the same coverage as specified in Figure 2 but also
are identical in terms of provider networks. Unlike managed care health insurance
companies, Medigap insurers do not form their own provider networks. Patients can
receive medical care from any doctors or hospitals as long as they accept Medicare
payments for procedures they perform. Therefore there is little room for a Medigap
insurer to differentiate its plans from other Medigap insurers’ plans.
Although one can expect that the Medigap market would be very competitive
because of the lack of differentiations among plans, the Medigap market is still highly
concentrated, and premiums for plans of the same type are dispersed. As reported
in Table 23, the average market shares of the largest insurer in each state is about
50%, and the smallest market share of the largest insurer in a state is more than 20%.
Moreover, the two largest insurers in a typical state control about 70% of market
shares. For an example, consider market shares for Medigap plan Cs in Pennsylvania
46

This is standardization before the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006, which provides
coverage for prescription drug expenditures. After the introduction of Medicare Part D, Medigap
plans H,I and J, which provided prescription drug coverage, were no longer offered. The data used
for this paper comes from years before 2006.
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presented in Table 24. Almost 90% of those who chose a Medigap plan C in the
state purchased it from one of the two largest companies. Table 24 also shows that
different insurers charge very different premiums for the same coverage. Although
some companies charges a similar or lower premium than United Healthcare, demand
for them is significantly lower than demand for United Healthcare. These results
indicate that the Medigap market is not very competitive despite the standardization
of plans.
Another important feature of the Medigap market is an open enrollment period
during which medical underwriting is prohibited. The open enrollment period runs
for six months, beginning when consumers turn 65 and enroll in Medicare Part B.
During the open enrollment period, an insurance company must accept a consumer’s
application regardless of pre-existing conditions and can vary premiums only on the
basis of age, gender, and smoking status. Therefore consumers of different health
risks would pay the same premium for a Medigap plan although their costs to an
insurer will be very different. Although this regulation on premiums would lead
to adverse selection, Fang et al. (2008) find evidence for advantageous selection in
the Medigap market, which means healthier individuals are more likely to purchase
Medigap. Regardless of a direction of selection, however, the open enrollment period
will make a consumer’s selection an important factor that determines a Medigap
insurer’s cost and eventually its pricing strategy. In order to study how a correlation
between search cost and health status affects the Medigap market, this paper focuses
a consumer’s choice during the open enrollment period.
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2.2

Data

I use both state- and individual-level data for my analysis. State-level information
comes from two different sources. First, I use information on a premium for each
state-insurer-plan type from Weiss Rating for the year 2003. This dataset provides
information on the premium charged by each Medigap plan in each state for 65, 75
and 85 year-olds. I use the premium information only for 65-year-olds because I focus
on a consumer’s initial choice of a Medigap plan during the open enrollment period.
I also use state-level data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC). The data set is a regulatory administrative database, which contains information on the total earned premium, quantity of new policies sold, and claims cost
incurred for each the state-insurer-plan type. An important feature of the data is
that the NAIC aggregates the information into three year periods. For example, the
2005 data contain information on new policies sold from 2003–2005. In this paper,
I use the NAIC data for the year 2005. Combining the two different datasets, I use
data from Weiss Rating for information on the premium for each state-insurer-plan
type. I do not use information on premiums from the NAIC data because the data do
provide information on premiums not for 65-year-olds only. Instead the data provide
information about the average earned premium per new enrollee, and a new enrollee
may include individuals aged much more than 65. For the market share and claims
cost for each state-insurer-plan type, I use information from the NAIC data.
There are a few issues in combining the two datasets. The first problem is that
the NAIC data are aggregated into three year period 2003-2005, as mentioned above.
This means that the NAIC does not provide information on Medigap enrollments
and claims cost only for the year 2003 although the information on premiums is
for Medigap plans offered in 2003. Without data at more finer level than what the
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NAIC data provides, I have to assume that markets in the period from 2003–2005 are
stationary and that a market share for each plan did not change over the three-year
period. Although market shares are very likely to change over the three-year period, it
seems unlikely that certain firms rapidly gained or lost market shares over the period.
Because the Medigap market with the regulations on the standardization and open
enrollment period had been around for a long time, dating back to early 1990s, it is
reasonable to assume that the Medigap market was stationary in the period.
The second problem is that the NAIC data provide information on newly sold
plans in the period, which may not only include individuals older than 65. Since
most of new Medigap purchasers are likely to be consumers in an open enrollment
period, I assume that observed market shares in the data set are equal to market
shares for 65-year-old consumers. Another related problem is that the NAIC data on
the average claims cost incurred by enrollees in each of newly sold Medigap plans were
calculated using all new enrollees in each plan who may be older than 65. Because
those aged more than 65 are more likely to be less healthier and incur more claims
cost, the NAIC data may overstate actual claim costs for 65-year-old enrollees. To deal
with this problem, I assume that a ratio of the average claims cost to the premium
charged by each plan is the same for 65-year-old consumers and older consumers.
Then I calculate the ratio using the NAIC data on the average premium and claims
cost for each plan and multiply the ratio with the observed premium of each plan in
the Weiss data in order to calculate the average claim cost for 65-year-old enrollees
for each Medigap plan.
I augment the aggregate-level data with individual-level data from the Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) 2003–2005. The MCBS is a survey of a nationally
representative panel of Medicare beneficiaries that is linked to administrative records
from Medicare. It provides a rich set of demographic information such as age, health
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status, income, private insurance coverage and so on. Since I focus on a consumer’s
initial choice of a Medigap plan at age of 65, it would be ideal to use samples only with
age of 65. Unfortunately, the MCBS does not have many observations that are 65
years old. Thus, I use observations with age of 68 or under.47 From the MCBS, I use a
demographic information such as income and self-reported health status. Importantly,
the MCBS also provides variables that can be related to an individual’s search costs
such as an individual’s Internet usage. I also retrieve information on whether an
individual purchased a private supplemental insurance plan from the MCBS. However,
the data set does not provide information about which Medigap plan an individual
chose. Lastly, I also use information on how much a supplemental plan paid for an
individual’s medical expenditures in a given year.

2.3

Discussion of the Data

Since this paper focuses on a correlation between search cost and health status, an
ideal data set would provide information on search behavior of individuals having
different health statuses. Unfortunately, the available data are not ideal with this
respect, and I discuss how I overcome the challenges. First, the available datasets
do not provide information on an individual’s search behaviors or information about
which Medigap plans were in his choice set when he made a decision. The lack of
such information makes it impossible for a researcher to infer about search frictions
directly from data. Therefore I construct a model of consumer search and estimate the
model with the available datasets on consumer choices and aggregate enrollment and
claims for each plan. Using the model whose parameters are estimated to rationalize
47

An implicit assumption made is that a joint distribution of individual choices and characteristics
is the same across ages from 65-68.
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observed choice patterns in the data, I will be able to infer about search frictions.48
Another limitation of the datasets is that I do not observe an individual choice
of a specific Medigap plan. Unfortunately, the MCBS provides information only
on whether an individual purchased a Medigap plan, but not information on which
Medigap plan type or insurer the individual chose.49 I overcome this problem with
the data on the average claims cost for each plan. Because of the standardization of
Medigap plans, it is reasonable to assume that claims for an enrollee in a plan will
depend only on the plan’s type, state-level medical care cost and the enrollee’s health
risks, but not on insurer-specific factors. The assumption implies that differences
in average claims costs of two plans of the same type in the same state result from
differences in overall health risks of enrollees in two plans. This means that the
aggregate data on claims cost can provide information about how consumers having
different health statuses sort into different plans.50

2.4

Descriptive Statistics

Table 25 presents descriptive statistics about the ten standardized Medigap plan
types. In terms of market share, about a half of Medigap enrollees choose a Medigap
plan F, and the type is the most popular among the ten types. Plan Cs and plan Js
follow plan Fs in terms of shares of Medigap enrollees. Plan As have the lowest average
annual premium among the ten types because they provide the least comprehensive
coverage, and Plan Js have the highest average annual premium because they provide
48

Usually it is difficult to have information on an individual’s product search, the approach taken
in this paper is quite common in the papers that structurally estimate a model of consumer search
frictions. For examples, see Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) and Hong and Shum (2006).
49
The MCBS has a variable that is supposed to contain information on which Medigap plan type
an individual chose. Unfortunately, a very large number of observations have missing values for this
variable, which makes it difficult to use the variable for the analysis.
50
This type of inference about individual heterogeneity from aggregate data is in a similar spirit
to Petrin (2002).
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the most comprehensive coverage.
Descriptive statistics from the MCBS in Table 26 shows that Medigap enrollees
are quite different from those without Medigap.51 A notable fact is that individuals
having Medigap tend to be healthier than individuals not having Medigap, which is
opposite to the selection pattern predicted by theoretical models of adverse selection
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). The observed selection pattern is called advantageous
selection, and Fang et al. (2008) finds that one of sources of advantageous selection
into the Medigap market results is income. Table 26 shows that individuals with
higher incomes are more likely to purchase a Medigap plan. Because those with
higher incomes tend to be healthier and are more likely to purchase Medigap, advantageous selection can result from income to some extents. Table 26 also shows that
individuals using the Internet are also more likely to purchase a Medigap market. Using the Internet would reduce the cost associated with gathering information, thereby
lowering search cost of an individual’s using the Internet and increasing demand for
Medigap. Moreover, the Internet variable is highly correlated with an individual’s
health status. Table 27 shows that those with better health are more likely to use the
Internet, which indicates a potential correlation between search cost and health status. Then the difference in search costs of individuals having different health statuses
can also be a factor that induces advantageous selection into the Medigap market.
In order to investigate how these variables affect a Medigap purchase decision
51
To measure a consumer’s health status, I use self-reported health status of a consumer from
MCBS. In the original MCBS data, self-reported health status has five categories: excellent, very
good, good, fair and poor. In the actual estimation, I only allowed for three different health status.
First, I put together the excellent and very good health status into a group, which will be referred
to as the excellent group from now on. Second, I leave the group with good health status as it is.
Lastly, I put together the fair and poor group into one group, which will be referred to as the poor
group from now on. I made this change for the excellent group because the consumers with excellent
and very good health status did not exhibit significant differences in terms of their observed choices
and claim costs. The change for the poor group was made because there were not many people with
poor health status for each state market.
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more precisely, I run a regression of a dummy variable for purchasing a Medigap
plan on observable individual characteristics. The results are reported in Table 28,
which shows that consumers who have higher incomes and use the Internet are more
likely to purchase a Medigap market. However, the coefficient for health status is not
positive enough to be statistically significant, which implies that an individual’s health
status is not a predictor for a Medigap purchase decision despite controlling for other
important factors. This is because the regression does not control for an individual’s
cognitive ability, which Fang et al. (2008) find an important source of advantageous
selection into the Medigap market.52 Because healthier individuals are less likely
to have diminished cognitive abilities, and because individuals without diminished
cognitive abilities are more likely to purchase Medigap, omitting a variable related
cognitive ability is likely to lead to biased estimates of coefficients for health statuses.
In the main analysis of this paper, I discuss how I deal with this issue of not having
a measure of an individual’s cognitive ability.
In addition, the aggregate data on the average claims cost for each plan show
how individuals having different health statuses sort into different plans. In order
to investigate difference in health statuses of enrollees in otherwise identical plans
charging different premiums, I run the following regression:

accljm = βpljm + δj + τlm + ljm

where accljm and pljm are the average claims cost and premium of plan type l of
insurer j in state m; δj is the fixed effect for each insurer; τlm is the fixed effect for
52

The reason why an individual’s cognitive ability is not controlled for here is because the MCBS
does not provide direct information on cognitive ability. Fang et al. (2008) combine the MCBS
and Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) for their analysis and retrieve measure on an individual’s
cognitive ability from the HRS. I plan to combine the information from the HRS for revision of this
paper.
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each combination of a plan type and state. Table 29 the display results from the
regression, which show that the estimate of β is positive and statistically significant.
Because of the fixed effects included in the regression, the estimate of β indicates that
more expensive plans are associated with higher claims with all other being equal.
However, the estimate of β cannot be interpreted as a causal effect of premiums on
claims cost due to likely reverse causality. A plan’s premium would be determined by
an insurer in an equilibrium, and the plan’s cost would be an important determinant
of the premium. However, Starc (2012), who also studies the Medigap market with
nearly identical data, shows that the relationship between premiums and claims are
causal using an instrument for a premium. This result implies that an insurer charging
a higher premium is more likely to have less healthy enrollees, conditional on plan
type and state, which is consistent with less healthy individuals having higher search
costs.

3
3.1

Model
Demand Side

For the demand side, I incorporate consumer search frictions into a discrete choice
framework. A consumer chooses to enroll in one of Medigap plans in his choice set,
which is endogenously determined by the consumer’s search behavior. The outside
option of not purchasing a Medigap plan is always included in a consumer’s choice
set, regardless of whether the consumer searches or not.
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3.1.1

Utility

Each market m is defined as a state. An insurer j in market m offers a subset of
the ten standardized plans Ljm , which I assume is exogenous to the model. Indirect
utility of a consumer, with characteristic z and plan-level preference shock , from
choosing a Medigap plan with letter l from insurer j in market m is:

uljm (z, ) =

J
X

βl0 1 [l = l0 ] + αy pljm +

l0 =A

2
X

βh,n 1 [h = n] + bj

(16)

n=1

+µm + ξljm + ljm
αy

= α0 + α1 y

When a consumer chooses not to purchase a Medigap plan, the consumer chooses the
outside option in the model. Since I can only identify a consumer’s utility from an
inside good relative to the outside option, I normalize utility from the outside good
to be:

u0m (z, ) = 0m .
uljm (z, ) depends on dummy variables for each plan letter l, premium (pljm ),
health status (h), income (y), brand effects (bj ), market fixed effects (µm ), and unobserved demand shock for each plan (ξljm ). Individual characteristics (h, y) are
included in z. Because Medigap plans are standardized, their characteristics are
identical across insurance companies. Accordingly, the dummy variable for each plan
type l0 , 1 [l = l0 ], does not vary over insurers. An individual’s preference for a Medigap plan depends on the individual’s characteristics: h and y. An individual’s health
status h affects the overall utility for any Medigap plan relative to the outside option.
An individual’s income y affects marginal disutility from a premium. As mentioned in
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a previous section, I use three different categories for health status: excellent, good,
and poor. I refer to excellent, good and poor health status as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
For example, βh,1 is the coefficient for those with excellent health status.
Although Medigap plans are supposed to be homogeneous, I allow for the possibility that perceived qualities of plans are different by including brand effects bj .
I specify that some large insurers have different brand effects bj . For example, the
largest Medigap insurance company, United Healthcare offer AARP-branded Medigap plans, which may raise a consumer’s willingness to pay for the insurer’s Medigap
plans (Starc, 2012). It is also possible that Medigap plans offered by insurers that are
members of Blue Cross Blue Shield have such brand effects, and these insurers tend
to be large indeed. In the end, I let the following insurers have different bj : United
Healthcare; Blue Cross Blue Shield, Mutual of Omaha, Banker’s Insurance, State
Farm, and United American. This means that other smaller insurers’ bj is normalized
to zero, and that their plans of the same type are homogeneous.
I control for differences in demand for any Medigap plan across different states
with market fixed effects µm . That is, µm measures the utility for a Medigap plan in
general relative to the utility from the outside option in each state. In order to see
what µm captures, it is necessary to understand what kind of options comprise of the
outside option. The outside option is the choice of not purchasing a Medigap plan,
which includes not only choosing the basic Medicare Parts A and B but also choosing
a Medicare Advantage plan offered by private insurers, which replaces an individual’s
Medicare coverage. Medicare Advantage plans have very different penetration rates
across states, which reflects heterogeneous preference Medicare Advantage, depending
on states. Because a consumer cannot choose both a Medigap plan and Medicare
Advantage plan, Medigap plans will face more fierce competition with the outside
option in a market with generally strong demand for Medicare Advantage plans. By
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including the state fixed effects, I control for such differences in Medigap demand
across states.
Plan-level demand shocks are captured by ξljm . Because Medigap plans are standardized and because we include brand effects bj , it is not very likely that ξljm captures
unobserved plan characteristics. Rather, ξljm is likely to be a demand shock. As is
standard in a model for differentiated products, I assume that ξljm is observed by consumers and insurers when making decisions but is unobserved by a researcher. Lastly,
ljm is a plan-specific preference shock from a Type I extreme value distribution that
is i.i.d across consumers and plans.
3.1.2

Search Process

In a standard discrete choice model, a consumer would simply choose an option that
maximizes his utility among all available plans in a market. I depart from the standard
model by assuming that a consumer does not necessarily know about existence of all
available options in a market and that it is costly for a consumer to gather information
about his choice set. I assume that a consumer searches for available options in the
following way:
1. A consumer in market m randomly draws a choice set s with probability P r(s)
without incurring any search costs.
2. After drawing the initial choice set s, he decides whether to search or not,
comparing his search costs and gain from searching. If he does not search, he
makes a choice within choice set s. If he does, then he makes a choice under
the full information about his choice set.53
53

It is possible that a consumer actual searching changes the consumer’s choice set more gradually
in reality. However, the assumption is not too restrictive because it is possible to find some online
resources that compare all available Medigap plans. The website for the insurance department of
several states offers such information.
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Initial choice set s is a subset of all available insurers in a market and always includes
the outside option. Let Jm bet the set of all insurers except the outside option in
market m. Then s ∈ Sm ≡ {x : x = x0 ∪ {0}, ∀x0 ⊆ Jm }, where ‘0’ represents the
outside option. If a consumer makes a choice under choice set s, then he can choose
any plan offered by insurers in s. I specify the probability of meeting with choice set
s in the initial stage in the following way:
!
Y

P r(s) =

ρjm


×


Y
j 0 m∈J

jm∈s

(1 − ρj 0 m )

m \s

where ρjm ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that a consumer meets with jm (firmmarket) in the initial stage of the search process. ρjm captures insurer jm’s advantage
over other insurers in a consumer’s search process. For example, an insurer’s strong
sale network or advertisement efforts will translate into a high value of ρjm in the
model. The first term represents the probability of meeting with insurers in choice
set s, and the second term represents the probability of not meeting with insurers
which are not in choice set s. I specify ρjm in the following way:

ρjm =

exp(xjm βx )
1 + exp(xjm βx )

(17)

where xjm is firm characteristics. For the estimation, xjm is a collection of dummy
variables for a variety of firms.

Search Costs A consumer with observed characteristics z will search if a gain from
searching is greater than his search cost c. I assume that c ∼ Fc|zsc with c ≥ 0, where
zsc is a consumer’s observed characteristics that affect his search cost distribution. zsc
includes: (i) a dummy variable for whether he has ever used the Internet for services,
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and (ii) a consumer’s self-reported health status. Because the Internet variable is
highly correlated with health status, and because a consumer’s health status directly
affect his search cost distribution, a consumer’s search cost can be correlated with
health status. In the estimation, I assume Fc|zsc is an exponential distribution with


parameter λ(zsc ; β) = βλ,0 + zsc βλ,z so that Fc|zsc (c) = 1 − exp − λ(zscc ;β) . The first
term βλ,0 is a constant, and βλ,z is a vector of parameters that determine the effects
of an individual’s characteristics on the individual’s search cost.
A dummy variable for each health status in the search cost parameters is included
in order to capture a correlation between health status and search costs that is not
captured by the variable for the Internet usage. Although the Internet variable is
highly correlated with health status as shown in Table 27, there are likely to be other
variables, correlated with health status, which can affect search costs. For example,
Fang et al. (2008) find that a decline in cognitive ability is an important factor that
lowers an individual demand for Medigap. Since those with a decline in cognitive
ability are very likely to be unhealthy, the decline was one of the most important
sources that induce advantageous selection into the Medigap market. As Fang et al.
(2008) suggests, a plausible way for a cognitive ability to affect an individual’s Medigap purchase decision is through search costs. Without a direct measure of cognitive
abilities in the individual-level data, the effects of health status on a search cost will
capture the effects of cognitive abilities on search cost.

Gains from Searching If a consumer searches, then he can make a decision under
the full information about the available choices in a market. Therefore utility after
searching will be
Vm (z, ) =

max uljm (z, ),

l∈Lj ,j∈Jm
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where Lj is the set of plan letters offered by insurer j, and Jm is the set of all insurers
in market m. If a consumer does not search, he will have to make a choice under
choice set s ∈ Sm drawn in the initial stage. With choice set s, a consumer will receive
utility of
vm (s, z, ) = max uljm (z, ).
l∈Lj ,j∈s

Then gains from searching will be

rm (s, z, ) = Vm (z, ) − vm (s, z, ).

Note that rm (s, z, ) ≥ 0 for any s ∈ Sm because a consumer makes a choice with a
smaller number of options if not searching. Given an initial choice set s and search
cost c, a consumer will search whenever rm (s, z, ) ≥ c.
3.1.3

Demand

Consider the demand for plan ljm from a consumer with observed characteristics z,
preference shock , search cost c, and initial choice set s. Define dljm (z, s, , c) to be
an indicator function which equals one when plan ljm is chosen:

dljm (z, s, , c) = 1 [jm ∈ s] 1[rm (s, z, ) < c]1[uljm (z, ) = vm (s, z, )]

(18)

+ 1 [jm ∈
/ s] 1[rm (s, z, ) ≥ c]1[uljm (z, ) = Vm (z, )].

This means that there are two possible cases in which a consumer chooses plan ljm.
The first term represents the case that a consumer does not search and that plan
ljm maximizes a consumer’s utility among plans in initial choice set s. The second
term represents the case that although insurer jm is not in s, a consumer searches
and chooses plan ljm. Note that if a consumer searches, he never chooses a plan in
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initial choice set s because gains from searching is positive only when the optimal
plan for the consumer is not in s. Then if searching, the consumer will always choose
the optimal plan over any plans in s.54
By integrating dljm (z, s, , c) over , I can calculate expected demand for each plan
given z, c and s. Following steps in the appendix, it can be shown that consumer z’s
expected demand for plan ljm is:
ˆ
qljm (z) =

X
s∈Sm

P r(s)
c

exp (ũljm (z) − c1 [jm ∈
/ s])
X
dFsc|z .
1+
exp (ũlj 0 m (z) − c1 [j 0 m ∈
/ s])

(19)

j 0 ∈Jm

Aggregate market shares for each plan Qljm can be calculated simply by integrating
qljm (z) over z:

ˆ
qljm (z)dFz .

Qljm =

(20)

z

Discussion The search model results in an individual’s choice probabilities similar
to a standard discrete choice model, given by equation (19). However, an important
difference between the model here and standard model is that given initial choice set
s, a consumer behaves as if the consumer’s utilities from plans outside s were lower
by the magnitude of search cost c. Given initial choice set s, an individual must
incur search cost c in order to choose a plan outside s. Then ex-ante demand for a
plan outside s must account for the costly search by reducing the utility from the
plan by the magnitude of search cost. Despite the difference between the two models,
the demand for plan ljm given s and c has the same expression as derived from the
standard multinomial logit model. Thus, mathematical properties of the demand
equation are not different from those of the standard demand model for differentiated
54

This result relies on the assumption that a consumer knows the distribution of utilities including
 from all available plans before searching and that values for  do not after searching.
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products as in Berry et al. (1995). This means that it is possible to invert the equation
(20) for aggregate market shares to recover ‘mean utility,’ which is the part of utility
that is constant across individuals. This also implies that the standard estimation
method can be applied to the model in this paper.
Another property of qljm (z) to note is that search frictions affect an individual’s
demand for insurers, but not the individual’s demand for each plan type within an
insurer. This is because search frictions affects an individual’s information set at the
insurer-level, not at the plan-level. In order to see this point, I rewrite the equation
(19) in the following way:
ˆ
qljm (z) =

X

P r(s)
c

s∈Sm

exp (ũljm (z) − c1 [jm ∈
/ s])
X
dFsc|z
1+
exp (ũlj 0 m (z) − c1 [j 0 m ∈
/ s])
j 0 ∈Jm

=

exp (ũljm (z))
X
×
exp (ũl0 jm (z))
l0 ∈Ljm

ˆ
X

P r(s)
c

s∈Sm

X

exp (ũl0 jm (z) − c1 [jm ∈
/ s])

l0 ∈Ljm

1+

X

exp (ũlj 0 m (z) − c1 [j 0 m ∈
/ s])

dFsc|z

(21)

j 0 ∈Jm

= ql|jm (z) × qjm (z),

(22)

where

ql|jm (z) ≡

exp (ũljm (z))
X
;
exp (ũl0 jm (z))
l0 ∈Ljm

ˆ
qjm (z) ≡

X
s∈Sm

P r(s)
c

X

exp (ũl0 jm (z) − c1 [jm ∈
/ s])

l0 ∈Ljm

1+

X

exp (ũlj 0 m (z) − c1 [j 0 m ∈
/ s])

j 0 ∈Jm
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dFsc|z .

The alternative expression of an individual’s demand in (22) shows that an individual’s
demand for a plan type l of insurer j in market m can be broken down into two parts.
The first term ql|jm (z) denotes an individual’s demand for plan type l given that
the individual chooses insurer jm; the second term qjm (z) denotes the individual’s
demand for insurer jm; and the unconditional demand for a plan is the product of
the two terms.
Such a property of the model implies that search frictions will determine how much
an individual is sensitive to a premium when choosing among plans of the same plan
type from different insurers. Because an individual with higher search cost cannot
easily substitute to plans of other insurers, search frictions will reduce cross-elasticity
of demand with respect to premium. However, search frictions will not affect an
individual’s price-sensitivity for plans within an insurer because an individual can
observe all available plans offered by an insurer in a choice set. This property of the
model will be exploited in identifying search frictions, which will be discussed in the
section for identification.

3.2

Supply Side

Given the demand system, an insurer chooses the optimal premiums for their plans
that maximize their profit given premiums chosen by other insurers. An insurer’s
expected marginal cost of insuring an enrollee has two components: claims cost and
non-claim costs such as administrative costs. An insurer jm’s expected marginal cost
of insuring consumer of health status h with plan l is given by:

mcljm (h) = E [cclm (h)] + ηljm ,
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(23)

where cclm (h) denotes the function for claim cost of insuring an individual with health
status h with plan type l in state m; and non-claim marginal cost is denoted by ηljm .
In (23), expectation is taken over a random error for individual’s realized claims cost.
An important feature of cclm (h) is that it depend only on a plan type (l) and market
(m), not on an insurer’s identity (j). As discussed in the previous section about
the Medigap market, this assumption is reasonable because all Medigap plans are
standardized and because a Medigap enrollee does not receive medical care from a
network of providers that are specific to an insurer. The need for the assumption will
be discussed later in the section for identification.
Insurer jm’s profit from plan l is given by:
ˆ
πljm = pljm Qljm −

mcljm (h)qljm (z)dFz
ˆ

z

= (pljm − ηljm )Qljm −

E [cclm (h)] qljm (z)dFz .
z

An insurer j’s total profit in market m is πjm =

P

l∈Ljm

πljm . The optimal premium

for each plan of an insurer must satisfy the first order condition as follows:

∂πjm
= Qljm +
∂pljm
l0 ∈L

X
jm

(pljm − ηljm ) ∂Ql jm −
∂pl0 jm
0

ˆ


E [cclm (h)]

∂ql0 jm (z)
dFz  = 0 (24)
∂pl0 jm

z

Note that because an individual’s claims cost depends on the individual’s health
status h, an insurer’s total profit will depend on the distribution of health statuses of
enrollees in plans of the insurer. Then an insurer’s optimal pricing decision will take
into account how different levels of a premium affects the distribution of its enrollees’
health statuses, which is captured by the the last term in equation (24).
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Now I discuss the specification of marginal cost mcljm (h). I assume that

cclm (h) = exp γm + γl +

2
X

!
γh,n 1[h = n]

+ ν.

(25)

n=1

The first and second term γm and γl denote market and plan type fixed effects. The
market fixed effects capture differences in costs of medical care across different states.
The plan type fixed effects account for differences in claims costs across different
plan types. Each Medigap plan type has a different level of generosity as shown in
Figure 2, and the plan type fixed effects will capture the differences in costs that
result from the different levels of generosity. Medigap plan A is the least generous
plan whereas Medigap plan J offers the most generous coverage including prescription
drug benefits. If a plan offers more comprehensive coverage, then the plan will be
financially responsible for a larger fraction of an individual’s medical expenditures.
Another possibility that can be captured by γl is the moral hazard effect. Because
an individual having a more comprehensive plan faces a lower out-of-pocket price
for medical care, the individual would be more likely to utilize more medical care,
raising the plan’s cost. The third term captures differences in expected claims cost
for individuals having different health statuses. Recall that h takes on 1 and 2 when
an individual’s health status is excellent and good, respectively. The effect of poor
health status on claims cost is normalized to zero.
Although cclm (h) does not include an explicit interaction between health status
and plan type, the effect of plan type on claims cost cclm (h) is not independent of
an individual’s health status. Because γl and γh,n enter the exponential function in
(25), the effect of γl on cclm (h) will depend on an individual’s health status h, and
the effect will be greater for individuals having health statuses with larger values of
γh,n . This property of the model captures the possibility that claims cost of a more
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generous Medigap plan is greater for relatively unhealthy individuals. Because these
individuals will incur more medical expenditures, and because a greater part of the
expenditures is covered by a more generous plan, it is likely that a more generous plan
is costlier for an insurer when enrolling a relatively unhealthy individual. Similarly,
the effect of plan type will be greater in states having higher medical care costs, i.e.,
larger values of γm . That is, a more generous plan is costlier for an insurer in a state
having a higher medical care cost.
Lastly, ν is a random shock to a realized claim that is i.i.d. across individuals and
plans. I assume that ν is completely random so that an individual does not select on
ν when making a decision. This assumption implies that

E[cclm (h)] = exp γm + γl +

2
X

!
γh,n 1[h = n] .

(26)

n=1

Then the first order condition (24) becomes:
ˆ


Qljm =

X
l0 ∈Ljm

−

exp

exp (γm + γl )

n=1

z

X
l0 ∈Ljm

(pljm − ηljm )

2
X

!
γh,n 1[h = n]


∂ql0 jm (z)
dFz 
∂pl0 jm

∂Ql0 jm
∂pl0 jm

In the data, there are two different kinds of information about claims cost. First,
the individual-level data (MCBS) provides information on claims cost for an individual
having a Medigap plan.55 Then I can calculate the conditional average of realized
claims costs for individuals of health status h0 having any Medigap plan in the MCBS,
55

Exactly, the MCBS provides information on how much an individual’s supplemental plan covered
the individual’s medical expenditures in a given year.
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E[cci |hi = h0 ]. The model is related to the data moment in the following way:
´
0

E[cci |hi = h ] =

z

P
1[h = h0 ] j∈Jm ,l∈Lj cclm (h)qljm (h)dFz
´
P
0]
1[h
=
h
j∈Jm ,l∈Lj qljm (h)dFz
z

(27)

Another kind of information about claims cost available in the data is information
on each Medigap plan’s average claims cost, Acclm . The prediction of the model on
expected claims cost per enrollee in plan ljm is:
´

E [cclm (h)] qljm (z)dFz
Qljm

´
P2
qljm (z)dFz
γ
1[h
=
n]
exp
h,n
n=1
= exp (γm + γl ) z
Qljm

d
Acc
ljm =

z

(28)

d
From (28), it is clear that the demand system indirectly determines Acc
ljm by affecting
the average health status of enrollees in plan ljm. In order to link model prediction
d
Acc
ljm to observed average claim costs in the data Accljm , I assume that


d
ln (Accljm ) = ln Acc
ljm + ωlm

(29)

= γm + γl + Hljm (q; γh ) + ωljm
´
where Hljm (q; γh ) ≡ ln

z


P
exp( 2n=1 γh,n 1[h=n])qljm (z)dFz
;
Qljm

and ωlm is a random error

that captures measurement errors or sampling errors due to a finite number of enrollees in each plan in the data. In equation 29, it is clear that once a market and plan
type are controlled for, higher claims cost for a plan can be attributable to the third
term, which measure the average health status of enrollees in a plan. This property of
the model follows from the assumption that cclm (h) does not depend on an insurer’s
identity, and I will exploit this property in identification.

74

4

Identification and Estimation

This section provides a discussion of estimation and identification of the model described above. The model will be estimated with generalized method of moments. In
this section, I present a set of moment conditions and how each moment condition
helps to identify parameters in the model. Then I discuss the estimation procedure
in details.

4.1

Identification

Claims Cost I start with discussion of identification of parameters in the function
(γs) for claims cost in equation (26). Given the knowledge of qljm (z), parameters γs
are identified using two equations (27) and (29). The effect of health status on claims
cost is identified by the moment condition (27), which provides information how much
Medigap plans paid for individuals with a certain health status. The market and plan
type fixed effects are identified by the following moment conditions constructed from
equation (29): for any m and l,

E[ωljm |m] = 0;
E[ωljm |l] = 0.

Mean Utility Although search frictions are present in the model, an individual’s
choice probability in (19) is similar to the choice probability in standard random
coefficient models of demand (e.g. Berry 1994; Berry et al. 1995). Given plan-level
unobserved demand shock ξljm present in the model, I include the following moments
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for aggregate market share:
ˆ
Qljm =

qljm (z)dFz for all l, j, m.

(30)

z

Berry et al. (1995) show that given other parameters, there is a unique mean utility
δljm that exactly solves the system of nonlinear equations in (30). Mean utility δljm is
defined as the part of utility uljm (z, ) that is independent of individual heterogeneity:

δljm =

J
X

βl0 1 [l = l0 ] + α0 pljm + bj + µm + ξljm .

l0 =A

In order to identify parameters in δljm , it is necessary to make a further assumption
on a joint distribution of ξljm and observed variables in δljm . Usually a problem arises
because pljm is an endogenous choice of an insurer j, and because ξljm is known by
the insurer when setting pljm . Therefore ξljm and pljm are likely to be correlated, and
an orthogonality condition between pljm and ξljm will be violated. A usual solution
for this problem is to use an instrument that is correlated with pljm but not with
ξljm . In this paper, I use a strategy similar to Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001), who
use the average of prices charged by the same firm in other markets. The identifying
assumption is that ξljm is independent of ξljm0 and marginal cost shocks ηljm0 in a
market m0 that is different from m. Given this assumption, premiums of the same
firm in other markets are valid instruments. Premiums of firm j in two different
markets m and m0 will be correlated due to the common marginal cost, and pljm0
will be uncorrelated with ξljm due to the independence assumption. In the actual
estimation, I use the average of pljm0 for all other markets m0 as an instrument.
For other variables in δljm , I assume orthogonality between them and ξljm . Because
Medigap plans are exogenously standardized, the orthogonality condition between a
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dummy variable for each plan type 1 [l = l0 ] and ξljm is likely to be valid. After all, I
have the following moment conditions:

E[ξljm |Xq ] = 0

(31)

where Xq is a set of the aforementioned instruments including pljm , the average premiums charged by the same insurer in other states, as well as plan types, dummy
variables for insurers having distinct bj and dummy variables for each state.
Overall Search Cost There are two different groups of parameters related to search
frictions. The first group of parameters are those that enter the search-cost distribution. These parameters determine the overall search cost for individuals and heterogeneity of search costs depending on individuals’ characteristics. The second group of
parameters are those that determine sampling probability ρjm . In this subsection, I
will discuss identification of the first group of parameters given sampling probability
of each Medigap insurer ρjm .
There are three different kinds of parameters that enter the search-cost distribution: a constant, coefficient for the Internet usage and coefficients for each health
status. First, I discuss identification of the constant term, which determines the overall search cost for all individuals. In order to separately identify the constant from
parameters in the utility function, I exploit the exclusion restriction that an individual’s search cost only affects the individual’s choice of an insurer, not the choice of
a plan type within an insurer. Recall the alternative expression of an individual’s
demand for a Medigap plan in equation (22):

qljm (z) = ql|jm (z) × qjm (z).

77

The first term is demand of individual having characteristic z for plan type l conditional on choosing insurer jm, which does not depend on the individual’s search cost;
and the second term is the individual’s demand for insurer jm, which is affected by
search cost. As discussed earlier, the exclusion restriction will create a wedge between
substitution patterns across plan types within an insurer and substitution patterns
across different insurers.
Thus, I construct the following moment conditions: denoting pljm as the instrument for a premium for plan ljm,

E[ξljm pljm × 1[j = United Healthcare]] = 0;

(32)

E[ξljm pljm × 1[j = Blue Cross Blue Shield]] = 0;

(33)

E[ξljm pljm × 1[l = F ]] = 0.

(34)

Moment conditions (32) and (33) are informative about consumers’ substitution across
plan types with respect to their premiums within each of the two largest Medigap
insurance companies; and moment condition (34) is informative about consumers’
substitution across plan Fs offered by different insurers. Here I consider plan Fs
because they are the most popular Medigap plan type and are offered by almost
all insurers. The constant in the search-cost distribution is identified by generating
substitution patterns that satisfy these moment conditions.

Individual Heterogeneity Now I discuss identification of individual heterogeneity
in search costs: the Internet usage and health status, and I also discuss identification
of preference heterogeneity in the utility for a Medigap plan. An important difference
between the two variables entering the search-cost distribution is that the former only
affects the distribution whereas the latter enters both the distribution and utility for
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a Medigap plan. Similarly, an individual’s income only affects the individual’s preference for Medigap plans but does not have impacts on the individual’s search cost. The
variables entering either the utility or search-cost distribution can be identified with
variation in observed Medigap choices across individuals having different characteristics. If an individual who uses the Internet is more likely to purchase a Medigap plan,
then the only way the model can generate this pattern is by making the individual
have lower search costs. Moreover, if an individual having a higher income is more
likely to purchase a Medigap plans, then the model must make such an individual
have less sensitive to a Medigap premium. Thus, I construct the following moment
condition using the individual-level data (MCBS):
#

"
E di −

X

qljm (zi ) Xmcbs

= 0,

(35)

j∈Jm ,l∈Lm

where di is an indicator variable that equals one when individual i in the MCBS
chooses any Medigap plan; qljm (zi ) denotes individual i’s demand for plan ljm; and
Xmcbs is a set of individual characteristics. Moment condition (35) requires that
the model predicts demand for any Medigap plan that matches observed Medigap
purchase decisions for individuals having different characteristics.
However, this moment condition will not be sufficient to separately identify parameters for health statuses in the utility and search-cost distribution because an
individual’s observed choice of whether to buy any Medigap plan can be rationalized
by either search cost or preference. Thus, I use another moment condition that is
informative about search costs of individuals having different health statuses. I use a
moment condition constructed from equation (29):

E[ωljm |pljm ] = 0
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(36)

where pljm is a premium charged by plan l of insurer jm. Given market and plan
type fixed effects in (29) are pinned down by other moment conditions, moment
condition (36) is informative about parameters that affect the third term Hljm (q; γh )
in equation (29). Note that Hljm (q; γh ) measures the average health status of enrollees
in plan l of insurer jm, which directly depends on demand of individuals having
different health statuses for the plan. Then moment condition (36) will be informative
about how demands of individuals having different health statuses are related to a
plan’s premium, thereby providing important information about substitution patterns
of different individuals with respect to a premium. Such information will identify
different search costs faced by individuals having different health statuses.

Sampling Probability Lastly, I discuss identification of parameters βx in equation
(17) that determines sampling probability ρjm in an individual’s search process. The
ideal dataset to identify parameter βx would provide information on an individual’s
choice set. However, such a dataset is hardly available for researchers. Therefore,
identification of βx must rely on observed demand and claims cost for different plans.
It is clear that the data on demand alone do not identify βx because variation in
demand for different insurers can be rationalized by brand effects for large insurers
or sampling probability. For example, United Healthcare has a large market share
because consumers prefer the insurer or because the insurer has a high probability
to be in consumers’ choice set. Thus I augment the demand data with the data on
the average claims cost for each plan. I supplement the following moment conditions
constructed from equation (29):

E[ωljm |xjm ] = 0
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(37)

where xjm is an insurer’s characteristics in equation (17) for sampling probability.
Similarly to the case for pljm , an insurer’s characteristic xjm does not directly affect
the insurer’s claims cost but affects the cost only through the average health status
of enrollees in the insurer’s plan, Hljm (q; γh ). Then moment condition (37) will be
informative about substitution patterns of individuals having different health statuses
with respect to an insurer characteristic xjm .
In order to see how an insurer’s sampling probability affects the substitution patterns of individuals with different health statuses, note that the effects of sampling
probability on an individual’s demand will be greater for individuals having large
search costs. If an individual’s search cost is low, then an insurer’s sampling probability will not matter for the individual because searching would not be very costly
for this individual. For an individual with larger search cost, in contrast, an insurer’s
sampling probability is likely to determine the individual’s choice set because this individual will not search for other insurers outside an initial choice set. Then insurers
with relatively large sampling probabilities are more likely to have individuals having
higher search costs. If search cost is correlated with health status, then the average
claims costs for plans of an insurer provide information about the average search cost
of enrollees in the insurer and eventually information about the insurer’s sampling
probability. Then if search cost and health status are correlated, then moment condition (37) will provide information about substitution patterns of individuals having
different search costs with respect to an insurer characteristic xjm , thereby identifying
βx .
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4.2

Estimation

The estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, I estimate the demand model
and the process for claim costs (25) jointly with generalized method of moments,
using moment conditions (31)–37. In the second step, I estimate each plan’s nonclaim marginal cost (ηljm ) using the first order condition for the optimal pricing (24).
∗
In the first step, I solve for mean utility δljm
that satisfies the moment condition

(20) for aggregate market share for each plan, using the nested fixed point algorithm
in Berry et al. (1995). Let G(θ) be defined as a vector of moment conditions (31)–37,
where θ is a vector parameters that enter the model for demand and claims cost. The
criterion function for GMM is given by Ψ(θ) = G(θ)0 W G(θ) where W is a weighting
matrix. Our estimation routine searches for θ that minimizes Ψ(θ). Evaluation of
G(θ) can be broken into the following steps for each choice of θ:
∗
1. Given θ, I solve for mean utility δ ∗ (θ) = {δljm
(θ)}l,j,m that satisfies the condi-

tions for aggregate market shares (20), using the contraction mapping used in
Berry et al. (1995).
2. With θ and δ ∗ (θ), I calculate the demand qljm (z) of an individual with characteristic z using equation (19).
3. G(θ) is evaluated with qljm (z).
Once I find estimates for θ, I invert the first order condition for the optimal pricing
(24) to recover non-claim marginal cost ηljm as in Berry et al. (1995). For the simple
case that an insurer offers only one plan, inverting the equation (24) results in the
following expression for ηljm :
Qljm − exp (γm + γl )
ηljm = pljm +

´
z

exp

P2

n=1

∂Ql0 jm
∂pl0 jm
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γh,n 1[h = n]

 ∂ql0 jm (z)
∂pl0 jm

dFz
.(38)

Note that all parameters that enter the right-hand side of (38) are estimated in the
first step.

5

Estimates

Demand Table 30 presents the estimates for the search cost distribution. If a
consumer uses the Internet, then the consumer will have lower search costs; and
individuals having excellent health status are more likely to have lower search costs
compared to those with good and poor health. As mentioned in the model section,
coefficients for health status in search costs distribution are supposed to capture a
correlation between health and search costs that is not captured by the Internet
variable alone. For example, Fang et al. (2008) find that an individual cognitive
ability is a main source for advantageous selection into the Medigap market. Those
with a lower cognitive ability are less likely to purchase a Medigap, and those with a
decline in cognitive ability are very likely to be unhealthy.
In the bottom panel, I report simulated search costs distribution for each health
status. The results show that the magnitude of search costs is large enough to affect
an individual’s demand for Medigap. The average search cost for overall population
is $832 in terms of 2003 dollars. This means that an individual is willing to forgo
$832 gains in utility by not searching. Given that an average premium for the most
popular plan F is about $1500, the average search cost is a very large fraction of
the premium. This large magnitude of the average search cost results mainly from
high search costs of individuals having good and poor health have high search costs.
Relatively unhealthy individuals have high search costs for two reasons: First, they
are less likely to use the Internet; and the second reason is because of the estimated
coefficients for health status in the search-cost distribution.
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Table 31 shows the estimates for parameters in the utility function. Conditional
on other characteristics, consumers with good and poor health statuses will receive
a higher utility from a Medigap plan compared to consumers with excellent health
status. Moreover, individuals with a higher income are less sensitive to a premium. In
Table 32, I report willingness to pay conditional on health status (but unconditional
on other factors), which was calculated based on the estimates. The results show
that unhealthy consumers are more willing to pay for Medigap plans. However, these
consumers are less likely to purchase a Medigap plan because they face much higher
search costs as shown in Table 30. These results are consistent with evidence for
advantageous selection Fang et al. (2008) find for the Medigap market.
Table 33 presents estimates for brand preference and sampling probabilities for
large insurers. The two largest national firms, United Healthcare and Blue Cross Blue
Shield, have both higher brand preference and sampling probabilities. The results
show that there are large variations in brand preference and sampling probability
across insurers. Given the estimated sampling probabilities, it is possible to calculate a
distribution of numbers of insurers in a choice set before searching, which is presented
in Table 34. The results show that a typical consumer will have a initial choice set with
a very small number of insurers. Combined with high search costs of the unhealthy,
an initial choice set with a small number of firms will have a large impact on the
unhealthy, which results in advantageous selection into the Medigap market.
Table 35 present elasticities calculated from the estimates. I calculated ownelasticity of demand with respect to a premium and cross-elasticity of demand with
respect to a premium. Own-elasticity here is defined as a percentage change in demand
for an insurer when the insurer increases its plans’ premiums by one percent. In other
words, own-elasticity measures the rate with which consumers substitute into other
Medigap insurers or the outside option when an insurer raises premiums. Cross84

elasticity here is defined as a percentage change in demand for an insurer when all
other insurers increase premiums for all of their plans by one percent. In other words,
cross-elasticity measures the rate with which consumers substitute into an insurer
when from all other Medigap insurers raise premiums. The results show that crosselasticities are much lower than own-elasticities in absolute values, which implies that
a consumer is more likely to substitute into the outside option than into other Medigap
insurers when an insurer raise premiums for its plans. The differences between the
two elasticities reflect the fact that search frictions affect an individual’s choice of an
insurer, not plans within an insurer.

Cost

Table 36 presents estimates for parameters in the function for claims cost

in 26. The estimates show that costs of insuring individuals with Medigap plans A
through G do not differ very much from each other. However, Medigap plans H,
I and J cost more than other plans. The main difference between these plans and
other plans is provision of prescription drug coverage, and the larger estimated cost
for plans H,I and J implies that prescription drug coverage is a costly benefit for an
insurer to offer. Table 36 also displays the estimates for coefficients for health statuses
in the function for claim cost. The positive estimates for good and poor health status
mean that individuals having such health statuses are costlier for an insurer to enroll
than individuals having excellent health status. Moreover, the estimates show that
individuals with poor health statuses are even costlier to insure than those with good
health status. The estimates imply that costs of insuring individuals having good and
poor health status are 1.8 and 5.1 times as expensive as insuring individuals having
excellent health status, respectively. This means that the average health status of
enrollees in a plan is an important determinant of the plan’s cost, and an insurer’s
optimal pricing will eventually take into account how its strategy affects what kinds
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of individuals would enroll with the insurer.

6

Model Fit

In this section, I provide tables about model fits in order to show that the model can
fit important features of the data. Here I discuss model fits only for the patterns in
the data that are not perfectly fitted with structural error terms in the model. Recall
that the aggregate market shares are perfectly fitted with unobserved heterogeneity
term in the utility ξ, and that the observed premiums charged by insurers are perfectly
fitted with non-claim marginal cost η.
Table 37 shows model fits for an individual’s Medigap choice in the extensive
margin. The data moments here are probabilities for an individual to purchase a
Medigap plan conditional on the individual’s characteristics. The results in the table
show that the model is able to fit the pattern in the data that unhealthier individuals
are less likely to purchase a Medigap. The data moments also show that individuals
having higher incomes and using the Internet are more likely to purchase a Medigap
plan. The model can also fit these patterns.
Another important feature in the data is a large difference in Medigap claims cost
for individuals having different health statuses. Table 38 shows that the difference is
very large between individuals having different health statuses, and that the model is
able to fit the difference.
Lastly, Table 39 presents the pattern in the data on average claims costs for
different plans and relevant model predictions. First, a very high correlation between
average claims costs and premiums for Medigap plan Fs in the data. Although the
model’s prediction for this correlation is not perfect, the model is able to fit the overall
pattern of the correlation. Note that the model does not have a parameter that would
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directly fits this pattern in the data. In other words, a premium does not directly
enter a plan’s claims-cost function. Instead, the model fits this pattern by making
unhealthier individuals to select into Medigap plan Fs having higher premiums, raising
costs of these plans. Given the feature of the model, I view that the model is able to
fit the pattern in the data.
The other data moments in Table 39 are average claims costs for large insurers.
I find that the model is able to fit the general pattern in the data on average claims
cost. Similarly to the correlation between claims costs and premiums, the model also
does not have parameters in an insurer’s cost function that would fit these patterns
in the data. One important assumption in the model is that the claims-cost structure
is the same for all insurers due to standardization of Medigap plans. Therefore, the
model fits the observed differences in average claims costs with demand of individuals
with different health statuses for different insurers. The model can generate differential demand of individuals having different health statuses by making insurers have
different sampling probabilities. As discussed earlier, insurers having higher sampling
probabilities will differentially attract individuals having higher search costs, who
tend to be unhealthier. Thus, the differences in insurers’ sampling probabilities will
play a crucial role in fitting the observed pattern in the data.

7

Counterfactual Analysis

In this section, I use the estimated model for counterfactual simulations. The purpose
of counterfactuals is to understand the effects of search friction on an equilibrium
and welfare. I assume that the government provides Medicare beneficiaries with
information on available Medigap plans so that all consumers have full information
about their choice set, even without searching. In order to understand an interaction
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between search frictions and adverse selection and its equilibrium effects, I simulate
the model under two different cases. In the first case, I simulate the effects of policy
on consumers’ choices in a partial equilibrium, where I do not allow insurers to reoptimize their premiums in response to the policy. In the second case, I simulate let
insurers re-optimize their premiums under the policy.
Table 40 presents results in a partial equilibrium. Because the only change in an
environment for consumers is absence of search costs, a consumer’s utility increases
for everyone. Medigap takeup rates more than double, and an increase in the rates are
greater for unhealthier consumers. Because search costs are larger for the unhealthy,
their choice sets are likely to have only a few insurers with search frictions, which
may not be always good options to purchase. With perfect information on available
choices induced by the policy, they can choose any available plans, which will lead to
a greater Medigap demand. As a result, the unhealthy are more likely to purchase
Medigap after the policy. In other words, the policy induces adverse selection in the
Medigap market, which originally exhibits advantageous selection. With respect to
welfare, overall consumer’s surplus more than doubles, compared to the baseline, and
an increase in surplus is greater for unhealthier consumers.
Although the policy increases a consumer’s surplus greatly for every consumer
when premiums are fixed, it is not clear how the policy will affect the market outcomes
when insurance companies can adjust their premiums. One one hand, the policy
can still be beneficial. Because a reduction in search frictions will make demand
more elastic with respect to premiums, insurers will have an incentive to reduce their
premiums, which in turn will increases a consumer’s utility even more. On the other
hand, an increase in the extent of adverse selection induced by the policy can increase
a premium and reduce consumer’s welfare.
The results are presented in Table 41. I find that although overall welfare increases,
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healthy individuals are worse off with the policy. Because insurance companies increase premiums, many healthy individual, who had low search costs in the first place,
are paying a higher premium without much benefit from the policy. Overall Medigap
takeup rates increase compared to the baseline, but an increase in the rates is not as
great as in a partial equilibrium; and takeup rates for healthy individuals decrease
due to an increase in premiums.
Why do premiums increase when firms can adjust them? There are two possible
channels in the model. The first obvious one is through the extensive margin. Because
more unhealthy individuals now purchasing Medigap, average claim costs for each plan
will increase, which leads to a higher premium. The second channel is more subtle and
through the intensive margin. Starc (2012), who studies imperfect competition and
adverse selection in Medigap, find that an increase in a premium leads to a higher cost
of claims because unhealthier individuals are less sensitive to premiums, and healthier
consumers are driven away by a higher premium. As a result, the substitution patterns
lower markups of insurance companies. In this paper, an unhealthy individual’s high
search costs generate the substitution patterns in demand and lowers markups in the
baseline. With the policy that give more information, the unhealthy individuals are
not insensitive to a premium any longer. Then an increase in premiums will no longer
lead to an increase in claims, which will give firms even more incentives to increase
their markups and thereby premiums.

8

Conclusion

In this paper, I study how consumer search frictions affect adverse selection and
competition in the Medigap market. I find that search frictions are significant and
their effects on consumers are heterogeneous, depending on health risks of consumers.
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Relative healthy individuals forgo about 16% of an average premium due to search
frictions, whereas unhealthy individuals forgo about an amount as large as an average
premium. As a result, the Medigap market exhibits advantageous selection. That is,
the unhealthy are more likely than healthier individuals to skip purchasing a Medigap plan even though the estimates suggest that they have a higher willingness to
pay for Medigap coverage. Although search frictions give firms an incentive to raise
premiums by making demand inelastic, high search costs of the unhealthy lower a
premium. When the government provides more information on available options to
reduce search frictions, I find that although many individuals benefit from the policy, adverse selection is induced, which makes healthy individuals worse off. From
this finding, I argue that efforts to increase access to information on available choices
should be accompanied by a policy that reduces the extent of adverse selection.

Appendix to Chapter 1
A

Constructing Health Status

In our analysis, an individual’s health status is measured as expected Medicare Parts
A and B claims cost if the individual were to receive insurance from traditional
Medicare (Medicare Parts A and B). In order to construct the variable, we use the
individual-level data. Because individuals in MA are not directly covered by traditional Medicare, information on Medicare Part A and B claims is available only for
those in traditional Medicare. Therefore we need to impute predicted Medicare costs
for MA enrollees. Our construction of the health status variable has two steps:
1. First, using beneficiaries in traditional Medicare, we estimate two equations
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that relate Medicare claims costs to an extensive list of health status and demographic characteristics.
2. We calculate predicted claims cost for traditional Medicare enrollees using the
estimates. We impute the predicted Medicare claims costs for MA enrollees in
the data, using their observed health and demographic characteristics and the
estimates obtained in the first step.

First Step In the first step, we estimate two equations that relate an individual’s
realized Medicare claims cost to an extensive list of health and demographic variables.
In the first equation, we estimate the probability that an individual ever incurs positive Medicare claims cost. Approximately 5.6% of individuals have zero claims cost
in a given year, and we account for the possibility of zero health expenditure using
the following logistic regression:

P rob(y > 0|x) =

exp(xβ1 )
.
1 + exp(xβ1 )

(39)

y denotes an individual’s Medicare claims cost, and x is a vector of health and demographic characteristics. For x, we include an extensive list of health variables such
as self-reported health status, whether an individual has difficulties in activities of
daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), and histories
of diseases such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, etc. We also include the average
Medicare claims cost for each county and year to control for regional differences in
health care costs. In the end, we include 76 variables in x. Parameter β1 is estimated
with maximum likelihood, and the results are presented in Table 21.
Using the second equation, we estimate the relationship between an amount of
Medicare claims cost and health characteristics for individuals having positive claims
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costs. We estimate the following equation:

log(y) = xβ + 
 ∼ N (0, (zγ)2 )

where y and x are the same as in the first equation; and z is a subset of x that includes
self-reported health status, whether an individual is living in a skilled nursing facility,
average Medicare claims cost for each county, and interaction terms between countylevel average Medicare claims costs and other variables in Z. We estimate parameters
β and γ with the method of moments. The first set of moments is:

E[log(y)|x, y > 0] = xβ2 .

The second set of moments is:


(zγ)2
E[y|z, y > 0] = exp xβ2 +
.
2
The right-hand side of the second condition is derived from the assumption that  is
normally distributed. The first set of moments will pin down β2 , and the second set
of moments will pin down γ. The estimates are presented in Table 22.
Note that we make an implicit assumption here that  is independent of the logistic
error term for equation (39). This means that a correlation between P rob(y > 0|x)
and E[y|x] only depends on x, not on the error terms. Although it is possible to allow
for correlated error term, we make such an assumption for simplicity.
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Second Step Given estimates of parameters β̂1 , β̂2 , and γ̂, we calculate predicted
Medicare claims cost for each individual. Because y is not observed only for individuals in MA, we have to impute predicted Medicare claims for MA enrollees using the
estimates. An important assumption we make for the imputation is that x contains
all relevant health characteristics of an individual. That is, individuals in MA and
traditional Medicare are not different in unobserved health, conditional on x. This
assumption implies that  is a purely random shock to claims costs, and individuals
do not select on  when choosing between MA and traditional Medicare. Without this
assumption, the imputation of predicted Medicare claims costs for MA enrollees will
not be valid. Although it is possible that x may not capture all relevant health characteristics, the large number of variables in x would minimize the role of unobserved
health characteristics.
We calculate predicted Medicare claims cost in the following way:

E[y|z] = P rob(y > 0|x) × E[y|x, y > 0]


(zγ̂)2
exp(xβ̂1 )
× exp xβ̂2 +
.
=
2
1 + exp(xβ̂1 )
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B

List of Plan Characteristics Included in the Model
Table 2: Plan Characteristics Included in Analysis

Mean Utility
Generic drug
Brand drug
Unlimited Drug Coverage
Dental
Routine Eye Exam
Glasses
Hearing Aids
Hearing Exam
Nursing Home Copay up to 20 Days
Nursing Home Copay up to 100 Days
Emergency Care Copay
Emergency Care Coinsurance
ER Worldwide Coverage
Primary Physician Copay
Primary Physician Coinsurance
Specialist Copay
Specialist Coinsurance
Inpatient Copay up to 5 Days
Inpatient Copay up to 90 Days
Inpatient Coinsurance
Quality: ease of getting referral to specialists
Quality: overall rating of health plan
Quality: overall rating of health care received
Quality: doctors communicate well
Number of plans offered by a Firm-county-year

Interaction with Health Status
Drug coverage (Generic + Brand)
Inpatient copay up to 5 Days
Nursing Home copay to 20 Days
Emergency care copay
Primary care physician copay
Specialist copay
Quality: ease of getting referral to specialists
Quality: overall rating of health plan
Dummy for Secure Horizon
Dummy for United Healthcare
Dummy for Kaiser Permanente
Dummy for Blue Cross Blue Shield
Dummy for Aetna
Dummy for Humana
Dummy for Health Net

Note: Dummies for different brands are implicitly included in insurer-county fixed
effects in the mean utility.
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C

Figures and Tables
Table 3: Capitation Payments and Demographic Characteristics
Dep. Var: Capitation Payment Paid for an MA
Variables
Coefficient
Female
219.3**
Male with Age 65–69
-165.1**
Female with Age 65–69
-286.2***
Male with Age 70–74
-67.81
Female with Age 65-69
-209.1***
Male with Age 75–79
36.74
Female with Age 75–79
-140.0***
Male with Age 80–84
97.85
Female with Age 80–84
-88.06***
Male with Age 85–89
135.2*
Female with Age 85–89
-24.38
Male with Age 90–94
117.7
Female with Age 90–94
-51.31*
Age
-17.34***
Living in a Nursing Home
-414.0
Medicaid Eligible
-97.88*
Avg. Capitation
-1.485***
Avg. Capitation × Female
-0.272***
Avg. Capitation × Nursing Home 1.664***
Avg. Capitation × Medicaid
0.624***
Avg. Capitation × Age
0.0336***
Observations
8,020
R-squared
0.822

Enrollee
Std. Err.
(88.20)
(81.18)
(34.91)
(80.72)
(33.11)
(80.45)
(31.20)
(80.00)
(29.93)
(80.32)
(29.44)
(83.38)
(31.05)
(1.671)
(287.0)
(56.98)
(0.180)
(0.0341)
(0.502)
(0.0885)
(0.00243)

Note: Avg. Capitation means the average capitation payment in county of residence for each individual, which is extracted from the Medicare State-County-Plan
databases 2000–2003. The regression was run only with the sample of MA enrollees.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003; Medicare State-CountyPlan databases 2000–2003.
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Figure 1: Relationship between Health Status and Over-payment by Location

Expected Health Expenditure
Note: Relative health = County-level Medicare Costs ; median of relative health =
0.6; mean of relative health = 0.89. These plots were generated based on a regression
of an amount of over-payment on relative health, average capitation payment in each
county, interaction between relative health and average capitation payment, as well as
other control variables that determine a capitation payment. The regression results
are reported in Table 6. The plots were generated for an individual of age 75 that is
not eligible for Medicaid and not living in a nursing home. The plots show that overpayments are greater for healthier enrollees and that over-payments for the healthy
are greater in regions with higher average capitation payments.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics at County Level

No Ad

County-years
Ad < $250k Ad≥$250k

No. of county-year
Population (age ≥ 65)/ county
% MA enrollment
Monthly Capitation Payments / enrollee
Monthly Medicare costs/ enrollee
No. of Firms
No. of Firms with Advertising
Premium for Firms w/ ad < mean
Premium for Firms w/ ad > mean
Market Shares for Firms w/ ad < mean
Market Shares for Firms w/ ad > mean

800
15,589
0.07
$520.3
$458.4
1.30
0
$57.8
n/a
0.05
n/a

1264
34,220
0.21
$534.2
$459.1
2.63
1.88
$42.7
$39.0
0.08
0.12

385
113,047
0.32
$613.3
$566.3
5.19
4.43
$29.9
$47.4
0.06
0.11

Total Number of Insurer-county-year

893

2648

1440

Note: ‘County-years with No Ad’ means county-years belonging to a local advertising market having no advertising spending; ‘County-years with Ad < $250k’ means
county-years belonging to a local advertising market where total advertising spending
is below $250,000; and ‘County-years with Ad ≥ $250k’ means county-years belonging
to a local advertising market where total advertising spending is at least $250,000.
Source: AdSpender 2000–2003; CMS state-county-plan files 2000–2003.
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Table 5: Incentives for Risk Selection
Self-reported
Health Status
Excellent
or
Very Good

County-years
No ad Ad < $250k Ad ≥$250k
Capitation ($)
435.1
450.4
520.0
Health Expenditures ($) 213.2
225.2
257.9
Over-payments ($)
221.9
225.2
262.1
Capitation ($)
440.0
464.3
536.4
Good
Health Expenditures ($) 394.9
385.4
444.7
Over-payments ($)
45.1
78.9
91.7
Fair
Capitation ($)
454.6
470.5
549.4
or
Health Expenditures ($) 721.3
736.1
912.7
Over-payments ($)
-266.7
-265.7
-363.3
Poor
Number of Observations
2729
7594
7729

Note: ‘County-years with No Ad’ means county-years belonging to a local advertising market having no advertising spending; ‘County-years with Ad < $250k’ means
county-years belonging to a local advertising market where total advertising spending
is below $250,000; and ‘County-years with Ad ≥ $250k’ means county-years belonging
to a local advertising market where total advertising spending is at least $250,000.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003; AdSpender 2000–2003

Table 6: Relationship between Health Status and Over-payment by Location
Dependent Variable = Expected Over-payment
VARIABLES
Coefficient
Relative Health
69.37***
Relative Health × Avg Capitation Payment in a County -1.012***
Avg Capitation Payment in a County
0.990***
Observations
31,756
R-squared
0.977

Std. Err.
(15.31)
(0.0278)
(0.0214)

Note: Other Controls are age, age-squared, age-cubed, Medicaid status, and
whether one lives in a nursing home.
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Table 7: Relationship between Advertising and Capitation Payments
(1)
Dependent Variable
Avg. Capitation
Population (65 <)
Local TV Ad Cost
No. of Competitors
Fixed Effect
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

(2)
Ad Qty

1.257***
(0.247)
7.94e-05**
(4.03e-05)
-68.71**
(34.16)
13.60*
(7.244)
Insurer
Yes
0.094
1,035

1.032*
(0.590)
3.94e-05
(0.000109)
-94.20*
(48.08)
-20.59*
(11.58)
Insurer - Ad market
Yes
0.039
1,035

(3)

(4)
Ad Expenditure
0.568***
0.693**
(0.128)
(0.294)
0.000139***
2.48e-05
(2.09e-05)
(5.50e-05)
17.75
-13.37
(17.71)
(23.98)
2.291
-9.311
(3.755)
(5.788)
Insurer
Insurer - Ad market
Yes
Yes
0.185
0.060
1,035
1,035

Note: The dependent variable in specification (1) and (2) is advertising quantity by
an MA insurer in a local advertising market in a year, and that in specification (3)
and (4) is advertising spending in a local advertising market in a year. Specification
(1) and (3) have market-invariant insurer fixed effects, whereas specification (2) and
(4) allow for market-specific insurer fixed effects. Average capitation payments in a
local advertising market is the average across average capitation payments in each
county belong to the advertising market, weighted by population of each county. The
variable, number of competitors, is constructed in a similar way by taking the average
across counties with a county population as a weight.
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Table 8: Health Status and Insurer Choice by Medicare Beneficiaries

County Category

Insurer Category
Traditional
MA w/ Ad
MA w/ Ad
Medicare
< $150K
> $150K

Counties with total ad spend = 0
Counties with total ad spend ∈ (0, $250K]
Counties with total ad spend> $250K

0.936
0.918
0.952

0.930
0.811
0.767

N/A
0.701
0.726

Counties with avg capitation < $500
Counties with avg capitation∈ [$500,$600]
Counties with avg capitation > $600
Overall

0.919
0.918
0.989
0.934

0.799
0.818
0.742
0.798

0.726
0.722
0.722
0.722

Note: The reported number in each cell is the average relative health status of enrollees in each insurer and market category.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2000–2003.

Table 9: Estimates for Key Parameters in Utility
Variables
Estimates
Ad effects (φ0 )
0.040
log (rhi ) ×Ad effects (φ1 )
-0.036**
Curvature of Ad effects (φ2 )
0.012**
log (rhi ) ×Outside option (part of λ)
0.233**
Premium (α0 )
-0.002***
log (rhi ) ×Premium (α1 )
8.0e-4

Std. Err.
(0.063)
(0.018)
(0.005)
(0.097)
(0.0005)
(7.4e-4)

Table 10: Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Advertising and Premiums
Semi-Elasticities of Demand
Overall Semi-elasticity
Semi-elasticity for hi < 25%
Semi-elasticity for hi > 25% and hi < 50%
Semi-elasticity for hi > 50% and hi < 75%
Semi-elasticity for hi > 75%
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Ad ($1,000) Price ($1)
0.063%
-0.25%
0.092%
-0.28%
0.070%
-0.26%
0.050%
-0.24%
0.020%
-0.22%

Table 11: Estimates for Parameters in Mean Utility (δjmt )
VARIABLES
Generic drug
Brand drug
Unlimited Drug Coverage
Dental
Routine Eye Exam
Glasses
Hearing Aids
Hearing Exam
Nursing Home Copay up to 20 Days
Nursing Home Copay up to 100 Days
ER Copay
ER Coinsurance
ER Worldwide Coverage
Primary Physician Copay
Primary Physician Coinsurance
Specialist Copay
Specialist Coinsurance
Inpatient Copay up to 5 Days
Inpatient Copay up to 90 Days
Inpatient Coinsurance
Quality: ease of getting referral to specialists
Quality: overall rating of health plan
Quality: overall rating of health care received
Quality: doctors communicate well
Number of plans offered by a Firm-county-year
Year FE
Firm - county FE
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Estimates
0.423***
0.275***
0.105***
-0.0318
-0.172***
-0.134***
0.204***
0.0982***
-0.00173***
-0.00209***
-0.000702
-0.108***
0.145***
-0.00111
-0.0446***
-0.00262*
0.0424***
9.36e-05
0.00159***
-0.0581***
-0.00873
0.202***
-0.0731***
-0.0378*
0.0268***
Yes
Yes

Std. Err.
(0.147)
(0.0399)
(0.0355)
(0.0362)
(0.0278)
(0.0349)
(0.0340)
(0.0370)
(0.000590)
(0.000383)
(0.00108)
(0.0125)
(0.0417)
(0.00247)
(0.00679)
(0.00137)
(0.00631)
(6.99e-05)
(0.000275)
(0.00454)
(0.0159)
(0.0177)
(0.0235)
(0.0206)
(0.00311)

Table 12: Estimates for Preference Heterogeneity
Variables

Estimates

Std. Err.

Health×Drug coverage
Health×Inpatient copay
Health×Skilled nursing facility copay
Health×Emergency care copay
Health×Primary care physician copay
Health×Specialist copay
Health×How easy to get a referral for SP
Health×Overall rating health plan
Health×Secure Horizon
Health×United Healthcare
Health×Kaiser Permanente
Health×Blue Cross Blue Shield
Health×Aetna
Health×Humana
Health×Health Net
Medicaid×Outside option
Employer benefits×Outside option
Age×Outside option
Age-squared×Outside option

-0.112
-1.2e-5
0.002
0.002
-2.3e-4
-0.005
-0.066**
0.016
-7.5e-4
0.016
-0.083
-0.107
0.013
-0.149
-0.107
1.464***
2.049***
-0.107
0.046

(0.140)
(2.3e-4)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.034)
(0.037)
(0.135)
(0.119)
(0.142)
(0.074)
(0.102)
(0.140)
(0.142)
(0.189)
(0.048)
(2.695)
(0.017)
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Table 13: Estimates for Marginal Costs of Providing Insurance
Variables
Expected Health Expenditure (h)
Dental
Routine eye exam
Skilled nursing facility copay
Emergency care copay
Primary care doctor copay
Specialist copay
How easy to get a referral for SP
Overall rating health plan
Population density
Percentage of urban population
No. of hospital beds
No. of skilled nursing facility
Insurer Dummy
Year Dummy

Estimates

Std. Err.

0.865***
21.00***
10.39**
-0.669***
-1.027***
1.878***
-0.860***
17.30***
-13.42***
0.00337***
0.365***
-0.395***
-37.97***
Yes
Yes

(0.0320)
(4.532)
(4.972)
(0.0985)
(0.221)
(0.403)
(0.236)
(2.638)
(3.021)
(0.000221)
(0.0565)
(0.0910)
(10.88)

Table 14: Estimates for Marginal Costs of a Unit of Advertising
Variables

Estimates

Std. Err.

Local TV Advertising Cost
Secure Horizon
United Healthcare
Kaiser Permanente
Blue Cross Blue Shield
Aetna
Humana
Health Net
Standard Deviation of ζ (σξ )
Year Dummy

0.491***
0.039
-0.271***
0.572***
-1.123***
-0.272***
-0.103
-.557***
1.356***
Yes

(0.123)
(0.135)
(0.119)
(0.142)
(0.074)
(0.102)
(0.140)
(0.142)
(0.579)
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Table 15: Ban on Advertising
All firms
(N = 4864)

Insurers with
Above-average ad
(N = 881)

Share of beneficiaries
Average Premium ($)
Average Health Status ($)
Over-payment per enrollee ($)
Share of beneficiaries
Average Premium ($)
Average Health Status ($)
Over-payment per enrollee ($)

Baseline
0.243
32.4
402.3
136.9
0.101
32.4
407.4
150.4

Ban on Ad
0.236 (-4%)
31.5
408.5
130.8 (-4%)
0.092 (-9%)
31.1
421.1
137.6 (-8%)

Note: A share of beneficiaries is the fraction of the total Medicare beneficiaries who
choose any MA insurers or insurers with above-average advertising spending.

Table 16: Consumer’s Surplus with a Ban on Advertising
Baseline Ban on Ad
rhi < 25% $112.8
$108.3
Case 1 rhi > 75% $135.7
$133.9
Overall
$116.6
$114.8
rhi < 25% $101.9
$108.3
Case 2 rhi > 75% $131.6
$133.9
Overall
$109.5
$114.8
Note: In case 1, the calculation of consumer surplus included the effects of advertising
on utility. In case 2, however, we exclude the effects of advertising on utility in the
calculation of consumer surplus. That rhi < 25% refers to the group of individuals
whose relative health status rhi is below the 25th percentile in the distribution of
relative health status. That is, this group is the healthiest. That rhi > 75% refers to
the group of individuals whose relative health status rhi is above the 75th percentile
in the distribution of relative health status. That is, this group is the most unhealthy.
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Table 17: Health Compositions in traditional Medicare vs MA (Ban on Advertising)
Baseline

Ban on Ad

Health Status of Enrollees in traditional Medicare ($)
Health Status of Enrollees in MA ($)
Difference between traditional Medicare and MA($)

462.9
402.3
60.6

460.3
408.5
51.8 (-15%)

Over-payments per MA enrollee ($)
Over-payments per a random beneficiary ($)
Additional over-payments per MA enrollee ($)

136.9
104.3
32.6

130.8 (-4%)
104.3
26.5 (-19%)

Note: The numbers in the third row is the difference between the first and second
row, and an additional over-payment is the difference between an over-payment per
MA enrollee and over-payment per a random beneficiary.

Table 18: Risk Adjustment
All firms
(N = 4864)

Firms with
Above-average ad
(N = 881)

Ad expenditure ($)
Premium ($)
Share of Beneficiaries
Expected health expenditures ($)
Over-payment per enrollee ($)
Ad expenditure ($)
Premium ($)
Share of Beneficiaries
Expected health expenditures ($)
Over-payment per enrollee ($)

105

Baseline
78.2K
32.4
0.243
402.3
140.2
392.4K
32.4
0.101
407.4
150.4

Risk Adjustment
53.7K (-30.7%)
51.1
0.221 (-9%)
406.7
140.2
282.4K (-27.8%)
63.5
0.091 (-8.8%)
411.9
145.4

Table 19: Consumer’s Surplus with Risk Adjustment
Baseline Risk Adjustment
rhi < 25% $112.8
$96.8
Case 1 rhi > 75% $135.7
$128.3
Overall
$116.6
$110.9
rhi < 25% $101.9
$99.1
Case 2 rhi > 75% $131.6
$129.5
Overall
$109.5
$107.3
Note: In case 1, the calculation of consumer surplus included the effects of advertising
on utility. In case 2, however, we exclude the effects of advertising on utility in the
calculation of consumer surplus. That rhi < 25% refers to the group of individuals
whose relative health status rhi is below the 25th percentile in the distribution of
relative health status. That is, this group is the healthiest. That rhi > 75% refers to
the group of individuals whose relative health status rhi is above the 75th percentile
in the distribution of relative health status. That is, this group is the most unhealthy.

Table 20: Health Risk Compositions in traditional Medicare vs MA (Risk Adjustment)
Health Status of Enrollees in traditional Medicare ($)
Health Status of Enrollees in MA ($)
Differences between traditional Medicare and MA($)

Baseline
462.9
402.3
60.3

Risk Adjustment
459.8
406.1
53.7 (-11%)

Over-payments per MA enrollee ($)
Over-payments per a random beneficiary ($)
Additional over-payments per MA enrollee ($)

136.8
104.3
32.6

138.5
138.5
0

Note: The numbers in the third row is the difference between the first and second
row, and an additional over-payment is the difference between an over-payment per
MA enrollee and over-payment per a random beneficiary.
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Table 21: Logit Regression for Positive Medicare Claims Cost
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Positive Medicare Claims Cost
Variables
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Black
Hispanic
Living in a nursing home
Health status: excellent
Health status: very good
Health status: good
Health status: fair
Difficulty using phone
Difficulty light housework
Difficulty heavy housework
Difficulty preparing meals
Difficulty shopping
Difficulty handling bills
Difficulty bathing
Difficulty dressing
Difficulty using toilet
History with skin cancer
History with other cancers
History of high blood pressure
History of heart attack
History of angina pectoris
History of other heart conditions
History of stroke
History of rheumatoid arthritis
History of arthritis
History of diabetes
County-level Medicare cost
County-level Medicare cost × Age
Medicaid
Employer-sponsored insurance benefit dummy
Observations
Pseudo R-squared

-0.781***
-0.540***
1.924**
-0.286*
0.00109
0.159
0.354**
-0.123
-0.0820
0.384***
0.545***
-0.0864
-0.307**
0.187
-0.283*
0.304*
0.533***
0.622***
0.583***
0.219***
0.342***
0.420***
0.253***
0.0372
0.411***
0.675***
-0.00965***
0.000131***
0.745***
0.363***
44,088
0.158

(0.0764)
(0.0957)
(0.815)
(0.153)
(0.149)
(0.145)
(0.147)
(0.106)
(0.134)
(0.0809)
(0.162)
(0.125)
(0.123)
(0.131)
(0.167)
(0.178)
(0.0726)
(0.0783)
(0.0501)
(0.0845)
(0.0963)
(0.0757)
(0.0896)
(0.0972)
(0.0500)
(0.0827)
(0.00182)
(2.42e-05)
(0.0961)
(0.0550)

Note: Other controls included are dummy variables for various groups of age, gender, interactions
of age and gender, income, education, marital status, self-reported health status compared to a year
ago. The number of variables included in this logit regression is 78.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary 2000–2004.
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Table 22: Regression of Medicare Claims Costs on Health Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Medicare Claims Cost
Variables
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Living in a nursing home
0.513***
(0.194)
Health status: excellent
-0.580***
(0.0525)
Health status: very good
-0.347***
(0.0489)
Health status: good
-0.140***
(0.0469)
Health status: fair
-0.0758*
(0.0457)
Difficulty using phone
-0.188***
(0.0374)
Difficulty light housework
0.0469
(0.0396)
Difficulty heavy housework
0.204***
(0.0238)
Difficulty preparing meals
0.143***
(0.0447)
Difficulty shopping
-0.00237
(0.0380)
Difficulty handling bills
-0.0195
(0.0411)
Difficulty bathing
0.199***
(0.0380)
Difficulty stooping
-0.111***
(0.0335)
Difficulty walking
0.0477*
(0.0264)
Difficulty using toilet
0.108**
(0.0493)
History with skin cancer
0.240***
(0.0199)
History with other cancers
0.437***
(0.0214)
History of high blood pressure
0.104***
(0.0181)
History of heart attack
0.228***
(0.0256)
History of angina pectoris
0.224***
(0.0263)
History of other heart conditions
0.284***
(0.0208)
History of stroke
0.124***
(0.0266)
History of rheumatoid arthritis
0.147***
(0.0270)
History of arthritis
0.174***
(0.0180)
History of diabetes
0.348***
(0.0210)
County-level Medicare cost
0.00109*
(0.000627)
County-level Medicare cost × Nursing home
0.00108***
(0.000282)
County-level Medicare cost × Age
1.87e-05**
(7.95e-06)
Medicaid
0.0820**
(0.0323)
Employer-sponsored insurance benefit dummy
-0.0112
(0.0179)
Observations
41,603
R-squared
0.249
Note: For this regression, only the individuals with positive Medicare claims costs are included.
Other controls included are dummy variables for various groups of age, gender, interactions of age
and gender, income, education, marital status, self-reported health status compared to a year ago.
The number of variables included in this logit regression is 78.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary 2000–2004.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
D

Proof for Choice Probability

In this section, I prove how to derive an individual’s expected demand for plan ljm.
I will define the integral of the first and second term of dljm (z, s, , c) in equation (18)
as follows:
ˆ
1
qljm
(z, c, s)

d1ljm (z, s, , c)dF

=
ˆ

2
qljm
(z, c, s) =

d2ljm (z, s, , c)dF


where

d1ljm (z, s, , c) ≡ 1 [jm ∈ s] 1[rm (s, z, ) < c]1[uljm (z, ) = vm (s, z, )];
d2ljm (z, s, , c) ≡ 1 [jm ∈
/ s] 1[rm (s, z, ) ≥ c]1[uljm (z, ) = Vm (z, )].

Note that:

1[rm (s, z, ) < c] = 1[Vm (z, ) − vm (s, z, ) < c].
Then, by letting ũljm (z) ≡ uljm (z, ) − ljm ,




d1ljm (z, s, , c) = 1 [jm ∈ s]

Y

Y


j 0 ∈s

1[ũljm (z) + ljm ≥ ũl0 j 0 m (z) + l0 j 0 m ]

l0 ∈Lj 0


×


Y

Y

j 00 ∈s
/

1[ũljm (z) + ljm ≥ ũl00 j 00 m (z) − c + l00 j 00 m ] .

l00 ∈Lj 00
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1
Using a property of type I extreme value distribution, I can calculate qljm
(z, c, s):

exp(ũljm (z))1 [jm ∈ s]
X
.
1+
exp (ũlj 0 m (z) − c1 [j 0 m ∈
/ s])

1
(z, c, s) =
qljm

j 0 ∈Jm

Similarly for d2ljm (z, s, , c), it can be shown that

Y

d2ljm (z, s, , c) = 1 [jm ∈
/ s]


Y

1[ũljm (z) − c + ljm ≥ ũl0 j 0 m (z) + l0 j 0 m ]


j 0 ∈s

l0 ∈Lj 0


×

Y


Y

1[ũljm (z) − c + ljm ≥ ũl00 j 00 m (z) − c + l00 j 00 m ]


j 00 ∈s
/

l00 ∈Lj 00

Then
2
qljm
(z, c, s) =

exp(ũljm (z) − c)1 [jm ∈
/ s]
X
,
1+
exp (ũlj 0 m (z) − c1 [j 0 m ∈
/ s])
j 0 ∈Jm

and consumer z’s expected demand for plan ljm is
ˆ ˆ
qljm (z) =

X

c

s∈Sm

=

X
s∈Sm

dljm (z, s, , c)dF dFsc|z

P r(s)
ˆ
P r(s)
c



exp (ũljm (z) − c1 [jm ∈
/ s])
X
dFsc|z .
1+
exp (ũlj 0 m (z) − c1 [j 0 m ∈
/ s])
j 0 ∈Jm
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E

Figures and Table
Figure 2: Medigap Benefits

Table 23: Medigap Market Concentration
Statistics
Market Share of the Largest Insurer in a State
Average
0.506
Standard Deviation
0.165
Maximum
0.201
Minimum
0.835
Number of States
25
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners 2005.
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Table 24: Plan C in PA
Company

Premium

Average Claim Costs

Market Shares

Blue Cross Blue Shield
United Healthcare Ins Co (AARP)
American Progressive L&H Ins of NY
State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co
Continental Life Ins Co Brentwood
United Teacher Assoc Ins Co
Constitution Life Ins Co
Bankers Fidelity Life Ins Co
Central States H & L Co Of Omaha
United American Ins Co

1332.2
1553
1588.5
1524.4
1317.8
1513.6
1859.3
2165.5
1662.5
2388

823.13
1242.32
1157.91
1241.84
928.98
1066.55
1139.83
1457.27
966.56
1356.99

0.6231
0.2647
0.0601
0.0210
0.0135
0.0040
0.0034
0.0020
0.0013
0.0013

Source: Weiss Rating 2003; National Association of Insurance Commissioners 2005.

Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for Medigap Plans
Plan Types

Market Shares

Average Annual Premium

Average Annual Claim

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

.031
.039
.174
.065
.031
.478
.06
.019
.032
.072

1005.9
1412.4
1482.7
1291.8
1297.6
1469.5
1233.3
2073.8
2151.6
2537.1

1031.1
1141.2
1236
1004.8
989
1109.7
947.8
1820.5
1629.8
2081.1

Source: Weiss Rating 2003; National Association of Insurance Commissioners 2005.
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Table 26: Descriptive Statistics from the MCBS

% Medigap
% Health Status: Excellent
% Health Status: Good
% Health Status: Poor
Income ($)
% Internet
N

Medigap Enrollees

Non-Enrollees

Overall

1
.560
.29
.15
37,533
.583
1,037

0
.507
.314
.178
35,186
.498
3,147

.247
.520
.308
.171
35,756
.519
4,184

(.499)
(.460)
(.373)
(28990)
(.494)

(.500)
(.466)
(.394)
(25751)
(.500)

(.431)
(.500)
(.464)
(.389)
(26,604)
(.500)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2003—2005.

Table 27: Correlation Coefficient between Health Status and Internet Usage

Health Status: Excellent
Health Status: Good
Health Status: Poor
N

Internet Use
No
Yes
.418 .619
.350 .253
.231 .129
2,088

Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2003—2005.
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Table 28: Linear Probability Model for Medigap Choice
VARIABLES
Health Status: Good
Health Status: Poor
Income
Internet Access
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Estimates
0.0148
(0.0128)
0.0178
(0.0158)
4.74e-07
(2.53e-07)
0.0727
(0.0223)
0.367
(0.0466)
2,088
0.224

Note: Dependent variable = whether an individual purchased a Medigap plan;
State-fixed effects are included in the regression; The coefficient for excellent health
status is normalized to zero.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2003—2005.

Table 29: Relationship between Average Claims Cost and Premium
Dependent Variable = Average Claim Cost of a Plan
VARIABLES
Premium
Premium
0.703 (0.079)
Brand Fixed Effect
Yes
State - Plan Type Fixed Effect
Yes
R-squared
0.3481
No. of Observations
1,330
Source: Weiss Rating 2003; National Association of Insurance Commissioners 2005.
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Table 30: Estimates for Search Cost
Parameter Estimates
Constant Internet Health: good Health: poor
4.54
-3.62
4.07
3.94
(1.21)
(0.95)
(1.32)
(1.01)
Average Search Costs in 2003 Dollars
Overall Excellent Good Poor
Baseline ($)
832
249
1415 1569
Internet = 1 ($)
590
105
1078 1198
Note: ’Internet = 1’ refers to individuals using the Internet.

Table 31: Utility Estimates
Variables
Estimates
Std. Err.
Plan C
4.16
(0.88)
Plan F
6.90
(1.86)
Plan J
11.80
(2.03)
Premium
-.0035
(.0006)
Income × Premium
6.8e-6
(2.2e-6)
Health Status: Excellent × Medigap 0 (normalized)
Health Status: Good× Medigap
1.09
(0.394)
Health Status: Poor× Medigap
1.04
(0.372)
Note: Estimates for coefficients for Medigap plans other than C, F and J are not
reported here.

Table 32: Medigap Demand and Willingness to Pay by Health Status

Overall
Health Status: Excellent
Health Status: Good
Health Status: Poor

Medigap Demand

WTP for Plan F

WTP for Plan J

0.210
0.221
0.204
0.193

$1,791
$1,656
$1,953
$1,915

$2,667
$2,476
$2,895
$2,846

Note: WTP = willingness to pay; The average premiums for Plan F and J are
$1,450 and $2,542, respectively.
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Table 33: Estimates for Brand Effects and Sampling Probability
Insurer

Brand Effects ($)

Sampling Probability

United Healthcare
Blue Cross Blue Shield
Mutual of Omaha
Banker’s Insurance
State Farm
United American

$262
$451
$73
-$130
$10
$336

24.6%
36.1%
5.0%
8.8%
14.6%
16.0%

Note: Estimates for brand effects in utility was converted to a unit of 2003 dollars;
An insurer’s sampling probability reported in the table is the average of the
insurer’s sampling probabilities across states it operate in.

Table 34: Distribution of Numbers of Insurers in an Initial Choice Set
Number of Insurers
0
1
2
3 and more

Probability
0.286
0.402
0.225
0.086

Note: The numbers reported here is calculated using the estimated model. The
probability that an individual does not meet with any insurer without searching is
28.6%; the probabilities that an individual meets with one and two insurers without
searching is 40.2% and 22.5%, respectively; and the probability that an individual
have three or more insurers in a choice set without searching is 8.6%.

Table 35: Elasticity
Own-elasticity with respect to price
Overall Excellent Good
Poor
-4.83
-4.69
-5.01
-4.98
Cross-elasticity with respect to price of other insurers
Overall Excellent Good
Poor
1.12
1.14
1.09
1.08
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Table 36: Estimates for Claims Cost

Plan A
Plan B
Plan C
Plan D
Plan E
Plan F
Plan G
Plan I
Plan H
Plan J
Health Status: excellent
Health Status: good
Health Status: poor

Estimates

Std. Err.

0.048
0.036
0.122
-0.061
-0.119
0 (normalization)
-0.119
0.415
0.243
0.527
0 (normalization)
0.595
1.162

(0.072)
(0.075)
(0.072)
(0.077)
(0.078)
(0.078)
(0.090)
(0.089)
(0.087)
(0.123)
(0.243)

Table 37: Model Fit: Medigap Takeup Probability

Health

Excellent
Good
Poor
Income
Below Median
Above Median
Internet Usage No
Yes

Data Model
0.248 0.247
0.217 0.213
0.208 0.199
0.219 0.203
0.244 0.263
0.194 0.194
0.267 0.269

Note: The data moments is the probabilities to purchase any Medigap plan conditional on an individual characteristic.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2003–2005.
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Table 38: Model Fit: Medigap Claims Cost by Health Status

Health Status: Excellent ($)
Health Status: Good ($)
Health Status: Poor ($)

Data Model
667
657
1207 1183
3239 3212

Note: The data moment is the averages of Medigap claims cost conditional on health
status.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2003–2005.

Table 39: Model Fit: Aggregate Claims Cost

Corr. Coeff. with Premium of Plan F
United Healthcare
Blue Cross Blue Shield
Mutual of Omaha
Banker’s Life Insurance
State Farm
United American

Data Model
0.438 0.364
1226 1230
1267 1173
965
1002
1112
962
1048 1094
1083 1171

Note: The correlation coefficient with premium of plan F refers to the correlation coefficient between average claims cost and premium for each plan. Other data moments
are the averages of claims cost for each insurance company.
Source: Weiss Ratings 2003; NAIC 2005.

Table 40: Information Provision in a Partial Equilibrium

Medigap takeup (%)

Consumer’s
Surplus ($)

Overall
Health: Excellent
Health: Good
Health: Poor
Overall
Health: Excellent
Health: Good
Health: Poor

Baseline

Information Provision

0.210
0.221
0.204
0.193
88
88
91
83

0.524
0.457
0.560
0.659
233
190
254
324

Note: Consumer’s surplus is measured in terms of 2003 dollars.
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Table 41: Information Provision in a Equilibrium Model

Medigap takeup(%)

Premium Paid ($)
Claim Costs ($)
Consumer’s surplus ($)

Industry Profits ($)
Social Surplus ($)

Overall
Health: Excellent
Health: Good
Health: Poor
Medigap Plan F
Medigap Plan J
Medigap Plan F
Medigap Plan J
Overall
Health: Excellent
Health: Good
Health: Poor
Overall
Overall

Baseline

Information Provision

0.210
0.221
0.204
0.193
1538
2552
1174
2314
88
88
91
83
63
151

0.225
0.165
0.294
0.278
1798
2904
1424
2648
94
63
130
118
69
164

Note: Consumer’s surplus, industry profits and social surplus are measured in terms
of 2003 dollars.
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